Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
All Sprouts Content

4-10-2008

Asian Drama: Discovering and Unleashing the
Mobile Services
Amit K. Maitra
Case Western Reserve University, maitra@verizon.net

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all
Recommended Citation
Maitra, Amit K., " Asian Drama: Discovering and Unleashing the Mobile Services" (2008). All Sprouts Content. 125.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all/125

This material is brought to you by the Sprouts at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in All Sprouts Content by an
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Sprouts

Working Papers on Information Systems

ISSN 1535-6078

Asian Drama: Discovering and Unleashing the Mobile
Services
Amit K. Maitra
Case Western Reserve University, USA

Abstract
Telecommunications privatization, competition, liberalization, and regulatory independence
in several countries have been embarked with the goals of maximizing universal access to
telecommunications services as a developmental goal, promoting efficiency through
competition and establishment of world class telecommunications networks. Using interview
data from India and China â the two countries that have very different governments and
policies, leading to differing approaches to the introduction of telecommunication
competition and infrastructure development -- this paper provides analyses of privatization,
competition, liberalization processes and legal frameworks governing telecommunications.
India has set policy via recommendations of publicly visible independent regulatory authority
while China has pursued a strategy of competition among government-owned organizations.
The Indian case study shows evidence of complimentarity between privatization and
competition in deepening network penetration and in dramatically restraining the rise of
service pricing among privatized operators. Chinaâ s case study reveals that the state
retained all the control rights, planned the countryâ s infrastructure development and made
very little progress in regulatory reform including the enactment of telecoms laws, yet made
substantial progress in infrastructure development. It remains to be seen whether India's
relatively transparent and market driven approach to telecommunications policy (and access)
will prove effective in the long run.
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Introduction
The purpose of this research has been to study privatization, liberalization 1 , competition,
and the establishment of independent regulatory regimes in the telecommunications sector in
several centrally planned economies. The liberalization of telecommunication markets through
the introduction of regulatory reforms is changing the way countries approach universal access
and service policies. This is due, in part, to the fact that services are being provisioned more
rapidly, prices are falling, and new and innovative services are being introduced—all to the
benefit of economic development. Notwithstanding these benefits, the public-private equity
sharing balance still remains unresolved in regulatory reform. Given the author’s commitment to
practitioner-scholarship, this research project aimed toward contributing to the understanding
and potential development of regulatory policy choices concerning a flexible and open regulatory
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology and
services and through that, economic development, which are practical concerns of national
administrations involved in regulatory reform.
Motivation
Telecommunications markets in developing countries have been undergoing dramatic
reforms since the 1990s. Changes in technology, the abysmal performance of incumbent service
providers, notably the state controlled monopolies, and urgings by The World Bank and other
international lending institutions have forced the developing countries to privatize state-owned
telecom providers, thereby opening portions of their telecom markets to competition, and
building regulatory institutions. Policy analysts and experts possess good theoretical
understanding of the likely effects of privatization and competition and of the importance of
regulation, as the monopoly provider is privatized. However, comprehensive empirical
knowledge of their effects in developing countries is lacking. What we have available today are
case studies and non-quantitative comparisons of telecom performance before and after
privatization (Ure, 1997). These studies are important in that they provide good theoretical
understanding of the likely effects of privatization and competition and of the importance of
regulation, as a monopoly service provider such as a state controlled telecommunications entity
is privatized; also needed is a more practical understanding of the interplay of three broad sets of
variables that this paper discusses:
•
•
•

Motivation for privatization
Interests and values of interest groups, and
Their impact on policy makers that determine the nature of privatization.

This practical understanding is the gap that exists because reforms in developing countries are a
relatively recent occurrence.

1

Liberalization is a process of changing state, social and economic institutions to allow and promote increased use of
market mechanisms to guide social, economic, and political life.
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Approach
Government motivations (as expressed by the types and values regularly considered in
shaping privatization decisions, whether they are related to various development goals, social
goals, external considerations, or intangible factors) and industry structures either clash or the
governments make some decision(s) that influences the Information and Communications
Technologies growth and expansion. For instance, one of the privatization options is to allow for
private ownership, while regulating the owners to achieve certain goals. This option has been
exercised in several Asia Pacific countries where the government privatized the telecoms entities
but then asked the private owners to achieve certain goals, which influenced the attainment of
those goals. To explore the structure of privatization, it is therefore pertinent to take a close look
at the behavioral expectations or the requirements that the government may have. That is partly
an empirical question, or the discovery that this research undertook, while conducting the full
qualitative research and analysis.
The research was conducted to review India and China in terms of each country’s
historical and economic circumstances, as well as its need for internal political accommodation
that determined its pace toward telecommunications restructuring. Looking at the outcome of
telecoms restructuring in these countries, at the conclusion of the qualitative phase, the author
was able to address a series of questions:
•
•
•
•

How are any of these privatization and liberalization outcomes similar?
How are they different?
If they have some things in common, what is the general category to which they
belong?
If they are different, do they indicate that telecoms restructuring efforts are only as
effective as a particular country’s socio-political-economic environment allow them
to be? 2

In the qualitative phase, question 4 has been particularly important. There are three broad set of
variables:
•
•
•

Motivation for privatization;
Interests and values of interest groups; and
Their impact on policy makers that determine the nature of privatization.

Between the motivation for privatization and the interests and values of interest groups, there is
the phenomenon of complexity to study (see Figure 1), for in the final analysis, the practice
question has to be addressed: What is it that we want to affect?

2

In other words, who are the main agents of change in an emergent situation? Are these the organized interest groups.
(Becker 1983; Olson 1965; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1975) originating from the country’s socio-political-economic
environment that are most dissatisfied with how the Telecoms Regulatory Authority accommodates their interests
(Greenwood & Hinings 1996; Holm 1995; Seo & Creed 2002; Sjöstrand 1995)? There are multiple potential sources
of misalignment between “an institutional arrangement … [and] the interests and needs of its participants” (Seo
&Creed 2002, p. 232), the focus of this paper is on the common case of organized interest groups that perceive
themselves to be disadvantaged by the distributional consequences of an emergent telecoms regulatory institution.
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It is not enough to say that we want to affect the structure of privatization process.
However, by looking at the interplay among the three broad set of variables, we might get a
practical understanding of:
•
•
•

How the interests and values of private actors create institutional pressures that affect
the nature of privatization decisions;
How those interests and values get processed; and
The extent to which decisions affect the behavior of interest groups in ways that are
consistent with regulatory policy choices for a flexible and open regulatory
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology
and services and through that, economic development.

Research Question
The practical understanding is crucial in obtaining a clear, strategic, and wise answer to
the research question: under what circumstances is clash between institutions making regulatory
policy decisions and interests and values of interest groups the likely result and under what
circumstances is the privatization decision likely to translate into behavior that is consistent with
development goals (as manifested in the motivation for privatization).
Data Source
This research deals with many decisions that policy makers make that influence the
nature and extent of privatization. The decision making about privatization has two aspects:
First, the interests that are relevant to various parameters of the privatization decision, namely,
interests in:
•
•
•
•

Development
Employment
National pride
Gaining favor with the IMF, World Bank, etc.

Secondly, the political-economic aspect:
•

The institutional features of any system that give preference, weight, or force to any
particular argument, recommendation, or claim.

The author argues that item 2a has been particularly under-attended in prior telecommunications
research.
As part of the standard procedures of essential analytic processes, the author obtained
interview data to uncover privatization decision action, including the preceding interaction with
many political constituencies expressing many different types of interests, and the aggregation
and balancing of those interests. Such decision action/interaction was traced over time to note
how and if the privatization decision changed or what enabled it to remain the same with changes
in structural conditions. The author interviewed former privatization minister, other senior
regulatory officers who may not be holding offices any more, as well as journalists, trade
association and corporate executives. These scholars, industry experts, and previous Cabinet
ministers were interested in recounting and describing their experiences in particular country
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decision making situations. These descriptions provided the author with a series of evolving
sequences of privatization action/interaction that occurred over time and space. The decision
action/interaction was orderly, interrupted, sequential, and coordinated—or, in some cases, a
complete mess. Those were the kinds of stuff that this research planned to uncover: How the
interests that get expressed and are relevant to the privatization decision got processed and how
we understand what WEIGHT they were given. Only the people who were once the main actors
and players could answer these questions. That then was the purpose of recruiting and
interviewing the past/present privatization experts and scholars.
The author’s early contacts with them indicated that they were often distrustful of
traditional research. Instead, these people favored mechanisms that assured them anonymity.
Accordingly, the author does not include any information in this paper that will make it possible
to identify a participant, when this paper is published.
Findings
The qualitative research to-date indicates that reforms have dramatically transformed the
telecommunications sector in several countries. For example, roughly two percent of
telecommunications firms in 167 countries were privatized in 1980; by 1998, the number
increased to forty-two percent. In many developing countries, competition, especially in mobile
phone, has increased rapidly since 2003.
The worldwide movement toward privatization and competition in the telecoms sector in
the 1990s provides an industry context for studying the effects of privatization and competition
in general. Countries often use privatization and liberalization in this sector to signal their
seriousness about instituting pro-market reforms.
Overall Conclusions/Theoretical Findings
The dynamics of international relations, mainly in financial flows, coupled with the
changing technology have created a new landscape whereby employers, employees and
government officials are witnessing a new pattern of relations. The concept of progress is
undergoing changes.
The new demand is for economic democracy. Restructuring now means the prevalence of
economic rationality through market orientation with social concerns to avoid exclusion and
misery. Professor Marcovitch observes that privatization has been one way of avoiding
inefficiency when supplying services that are of general interest (Marcovitch, 2005). He argues
that in spite of the benefits and apparent relationship between privatization, restructuring and
economic democracy, further research is needed.
It is clear from this qualitative research that there is an objective relationship between the
above dimensions but a direct link between cause and effect can only be determined through
further studies. Further to Marcovitch’s observations, countries such as India and sectors such as
the telecommunications industry provide examples of the virtuous circle between privatization,
restructuring and economic democracy.
In 1998, India entered the second phase of the revolution brought about by telecoms
privatization. Having sold government assets in the mobile telecoms sector, there was nothing
left to sell. There was, however, plenty of scope for the competition and price cutting that then
followed. Other countries that have been slower off the mark in the privatization race must take
note: this second stage was more painful, more controversial and more beneficial than the first.
The Indian consumer at last became the chief beneficiary of telecoms competition. Since then the
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Figure 1. Study of the phenomenon of complexity
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new Government has been increasing competition to benefit those who put them in power: the
general mass.
The independent regulator in telecoms industry in India, Telecoms Regulatory Authority
of India (TRAI), is encouraged by their new political masters. TRAI is reviewing licenses and
exercising its authority. A new competition bill, which came into effect in 1998, increased the
power of the watchdog to tackle anti-competitive practices in the mobile sector.
In this context, the positive attitude of all the social players are crucial in order to
reinforce the conviction that privatization and restructuring can be conducted in the interests of
the people.
The privatization of the telecommunications industry in India has also demonstrated that
it is possible to privatize companies and enhance benefits for the individual. To succeed in this
task, it has been necessary to promote a change in regulatory policy in a way that spurs
technological innovation and provides incentives for companies to create markets for new
services as well as expand their current service markets, allowing them to create several new job
training and retraining schemes that have played an important role in maintaining employment
security in both existing and newly formed companies, by disclosing information and strategy
which allowed a genuine participatory approach. Integrating all the social players has given
transparency to the privatization process and provided economic democracy.
Implications for Practice
As discussed under “Approach,” between the motivation for privatization and the interests and
values of interest groups, there is the phenomenon of complexity to study (see Figure 1 below),
for in the final analysis, the practice question has to be addressed: What is it that we want to
affect?
The author argues that by looking at the interplay among the three broad set of variables, we
might get a practical understanding of:
•
•
•

How the interests and values of private actors create institutional pressures that affect
the nature of privatization decisions;
How those interests and values get processed; and
The extent to which decisions affect the behavior of interest groups in ways that are
consistent with regulatory policy choices for a flexible and open regulatory
environment conducive to sustaining advancement of telecommunications technology
and services and through that, economic development 3 .

This practical understanding benefits us in more than one way. First, it provides a clear, strategic,
and wise answer to the research question: under what circumstances is clash between institutions
making regulatory policy decisions and interests and values of interest groups the likely result
3 Improving the teledensity of a nation is an important policy objective, both for providing better connectivity among

the country’s population and the several beneficial spillover effects. One such effect is the positive boost to a country’s
economic growth associated with higher teledensity. Empirical evidence in both developed and developing countries
shows that an increase in teledensity contributes substantially to an improvement in real income and job creation
through encouragement of viable small entrepreneurial business enterprises at the grassroots level. These enterprises
principally operate in the service sector, expanding it to the most consequential level vis-à-vis manufacturing and
agriculture. From the government point of view, this will result in a rapid widening of the economic base without
necessitating a corresponding rise in government staffing.
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and under what circumstances is the privatization decision likely to translate into behavior that
is consistent with development goals (as manifested in the motivation for privatization).
Secondly, our practical understanding forms the basis for affecting the structure of privatization
process in future.
Third, there has been much theoretical and empirical research on the effects of privatization and
competition in infrastructure in general. However, relatively little work has been done on:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Why is the reform process at different stage in different countries?
Why is the extent of the reforms larger in some countries than in others?
How the degree of privatization and competition affects performance?
How components of the policies interact in shaping the reform outcomes?
Is privatization (or competition) alone sufficient in improving economic
development 4 ?
Or, are privatization and competition complementary policies?

The practical understanding should lead one to appreciate the dynamics of change and
transformation in clear, strategic, and operational terms.

Relevance of Grounded Theory to Privatization and Restructuring Research
This paper articulates the use of grounded theory, originated and most fully articulated by
Glaser & Strauss (1967) in their seminal work The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for
qualitative research, in this research. The objective of the grounded theoretical approach, as
interpreted 5 by Wells (1995), is an explanation of the variability in social interactions, the social
structural conditions that support the interactions, the consequences of the interactions and the
conditions that support changes in interactions over time. Wells’ interpretation is noteworthy in
that this research is about the explanation of the variability of social and political interaction as
well as the consequences of the interaction in the realm of telecoms restructuring.

4 Economic development: Breaking down of traditional barriers to distribution and sales of rural produce in urban

markets and vice versa, acceleration of literacy and education rates in the general public and consequent
improvement in real income, and job creation through encouragement of viable small entrepreneurial business
enterprises at the grassroots level. These enterprises principally operate in the services sector, expanding it to the
most consequential level vis-a-vis manufacturing and agriculture, which presently dominates. From the government
point of view, this results in a rapid widening of the direct tax base without necessitating a corresponding rise in
government staffing. However, income from direct telecom revenues will be much slower, thus reinforcing the
government policy of expanding capacity through the private sector
5

There are a variety of applied interpretive assessments of what constitutes grounded theory, however, the one
developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is referenced most commonly by researchers. This work is considered to be
"the clearest theoretical exposition of this important research tradition" (Miller & Fredericks, 1999). Strauss and
Corbin define a grounded theory as one that is: ".......inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it
represents. That is, it is discovered, developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and
analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis and theory stand in reciprocal
relationship with each other." (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
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In an historical context, grounded theory may be considered to have evolved from and
continues to be compatible with the symbolic interactionist approach 6 to the study of human
behavior (Robrecht 1995, Wells 1995). Sociologist George Herbert Mead and later Blumer
(1986) employed the symbolic interactionism approach, with the articulation of three key
principles 7 :
Symbolic Interactionism holds the principal of meaning as central in human behavior.
Meaning states that humans act toward people and things based upon the meanings that they
have given to those people or things.
The second core principle is language. Language gives humans a means by which to
negotiate meaning through symbols. Mead's influence on Blumer becomes apparent here because
Mead believed that naming assigned meaning, thus naming was the basis for human society and
the extent of knowledge.
The third core principle is that of thought. Thought modifies each individual's
interpretation of symbols. Thought, based-on language, is a mental conversation or dialogue that
requires role taking, or imagining different points of view.
While conducting interviews, the author found symbolic interactionism approach with its
key premises to hold the promise of uncovering privatization decision actions, including any
preceding interaction with many political constituencies expressing many different types of
interests, and the aggregation and balancing of those interests. This and the notion that the fields
of medicine, nursing, social work, and education 8 share the common socio-behavioral foundation
with the study of human interaction within an organization suggests that grounded theory may be
a useful methodology for application in the investigation of phenomena in this later domain. This
research paper therefore uses grounded theory’s practical and theoretical suitability, to the
maximum extent possible, as a form of qualitative inquiry into complex, multi-dimensional
phenomena observed in an organizational /institutional context that this research sought to
evaluate to further the process of formulating creative, workable, effective interventions through
the use of policy/grounded action.
Using 1990 through 2003 data of key centrally planned countries 9 , the research has
focused on an initial analysis of the effects of telecommunications performance of privatization,
competition (as measured by the number of mobile operators in the country not owned by the
incumbent), and regulation. 10 Subsequently with additional interview data, the research work
6

Symbolic Interactionism is the process of interaction in the formation of meanings for individuals. John Dewey
insisted that human beings are best understood in relation to their environment (Society for More Creative Speech,
1996). With this as his inspiration, Herbert Blumer outlined Symbolic Interactionism, a study of human group life
and conduct.
7

Blumer came up with three core principles to his theory. They are meaning, language, and thought. These core
principles lead to conclusions about the creation of a person's self and socialization into a larger community (Griffin,
1997).
8 Many contemporary authors have argued that grounded theory is the research methodology of choice in the
qualitatively oriented research fields of medicine, nursing, social work and education (Wells 1995, Miller &
Fredericks 1999).
9

This dataset was originally collected by the author of this paper as part of a study commissioned by the Financial
Times of London in 1998-1999 timeframe.

10

The privatization, competition, and regulatory variables are to be obtained from International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) publications, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publications, and from the US Department of
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has been supplemented to identify and define some key factors or associations that policy makers
evaluate to determine the nature and extent of privatization. There are two aspects of decision
making that this research addresses:
The interests that are relevant to various parameters of the privatization decision, namely,
interests in:
•
•
•
•

Development
Employment
National pride
Gaining favor with the IMF, World Bank, etc.

The political-economic aspect:
•

The institutional features of any system that give preference, weight, or force to any
particular argument, recommendation, or claim.

The author contends that item 2a has been particularly under-attended in prior
telecommunications research.
As part of the standard methods and procedures of essential analytic processes, the author
has conducted interviews to uncover privatization decision actions, including any preceding
interaction with many political constituencies expressing many different types of interests, and
the aggregation and balancing of those interests. The interest groups include:
A powerful liberalization coalition comprising:
•
•
•

International and domestic businesses supported by foreign governments and
international organizations;
Urban users who are exerting pressures through the media and other agencies;
An opposing coalition consisting of the trade unions and politicians supported by
domestic businesses that benefit from the past or extant inward-oriented policies and
have a stake in keeping multi-national corporations out of the market.

The author has been particularly interested in investigating how the interests that get
expressed and are relevant to the privatization decisions get processed and if a certain structure
results in a certain outcome or if under some circumstances the structure is likely to translate into
behavior of the interest groups that is consistent or inconsistent with regulatory policy choices
concerning a flexible and open regulatory environment conducive to sustaining advancement of
Commerce. Privatization is a dummy variable in that it does not capture the extent of privatization. Rather it simply
indicates whether a government sold part of the firm. Competition is measured by the number of wireless operators
in a country not owned by the incumbent. This may not be a perfect measure of competition for cellular service is
effectively available only to the wealthy in very poor countries. However, mobile operators offer benchmark
comparisons of the incumbent and are potential threats to the incumbent. Mobile operators can increase penetration
rapidly at relatively low cost per additional subscriber, thereby forcing the incumbent to improve its services.
The information concerning regulatory measure will be collected from ITU publications. It is also a dummy
variable indicating whether a country maintains a separate telecommunications regulatory agency not directly under
the control of a ministry. A separate regulator is typically indicative of attempts at regulatory reform.
© 2006 Sprouts 6(4), pp 166-220, http://sprouts.case.edu/2006/060406.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-7

175

MAITRA/ASIAN MOBILE SERVICES

telecommunications technology and services and through that of economic development, which
are the practical concerns of national administrations involved in the regulatory reform problem.
Through several semi-structured interviews with key representatives 11 of the various
coalitions identified above, the author has collected data on liberalization, competition, the
establishment of independent authority, and privatization for satisfactorily completing the
telecoms reforms in India and China. In these interview studies grounded theory is used to
capture information needed to explicate the interactions between groups and organizations.
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) theories are either deducted from logical assumptions or
generated from observation. The resulting theory is an explanation of categories, their properties,
and the relationships among them. The results lead to an evolutionary body of knowledge that is
grounded in data. That, then, is the primary reason for using grounded theory to interpret
interviews.
The Elements of Grounded Theory
Grounded theory has three basic elements: concepts, categories and propositions. These
are discussed in great detail in Appendix C. However, it is important to mention here that the
basic units of analysis are concepts, for it is through conceptualization of data, not the actual data
per se, that theory will emerge. According to Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7):
“Theories can't be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; that is,
from "raw data." The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or analyzed as, potential
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels. … Only by comparing
incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic
units for theory.”
The unit of data (see Appendix C) in this study is the literature on the subject of telecoms
restructuring. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990),
The literature can be used as secondary sources of data. Research publications often include
quoted materials from interviews and field notes and these quotations can be used as secondary
sources of data for your own purposes. The publications may also include descriptive materials
concerning events, actions, settings, and actors' perspectives, that can be used as data using the
methods described. (p. 52)

The grounded analysis of the first 'literature' case from India led to the generation of the
initial theoretical framework of complexity analysis. Additional 'empirical' cases from China
have been used to test and extend this framework. 12
After the analysis of the two/three case memos, there was hardly any improvement
needed to the theoretical framework and the decision to conclude the research, which began with
11 Samples include people who are experiencing the social-economic-political process being investigated.
12 The principle of theoretical sampling points out that each additional case serves specific purposes within the overall
scope of enquiry. Yin identified three options (1989): (a) Choose a case to fill theoretical categories, to extend the
emerging theory; and/or, (b) Choose a case to replicate previous case(s) to test the emerging theory; or, (c) Choose a
case that is a polar opposite to extend the emerging theory. Each additional case must, therefore, be carefully selected
to produce similar results (a literal replication - options (a) and (b) above); or, contrary results but for predictable
reasons (a theoretical replication - option (c) above). The second case or unit of data, China which experienced a
telecoms restructuring during the period 1990-99, was selected for the purpose of literal replication, that is, to fill
theoretical categories and to test the emerging theory. The third case, Russia which experienced contrary results during
the period 1975-89 was again chosen for the purposes of theoretical replication.
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an investigation of the three questions identified in page 3, was taken. This experience is line
with Martin and Turner (1986), who affirm:
By the time three or four sets of data have been analyzed, the majority of useful concepts will have
been discovered (refer to Appendix C). (p. 149)

The emergent theory of telecoms restructuring has been compared with the extant
theories in the broader field of crisis hypothesis, special interest groups, learning, foreign aid,
and political institutions. This revealed the discovered theory to resemble in many ways Li et al.
(2004) "constituents demand hypothesis, private-interest hypothesis, the ideology hypothesis,
and some hypothesis emerging from the new institutional economics."

Building Individual Cases: India & China
First Memo: India, View of Epistemology
The author interviewed one of the highest ranking policy advisors in India. He had the
unenviable task of getting the country’s top public sector undertakings out of the mess through
privatization. 13 That meant convincing a whole lot of politicians, trade unions, and cajoling
‘unionized’ employees of these loss making inefficient units. To protect his identity, this
regulator would remain anonymous and for identifying him in this paper, we would refer to him
as Regulator 1 (Reg_1).
Epistemology. Reg_1 clearly has an objective view of knowing, particularly in the
context of the limits or validity of the various ways of knowing and learning. He traces the recent
telecoms market and regulatory developments in India, which have dramatically altered a
difficult telecoms market environment into a positive one with immense possibilities. 14
One of the major factors contributing to unprecedented growth is the low price level;
Reg_1 explains that it is important that efforts be made to seek ways to enable further price
declines, even if such policies adversely affect the Government’s revenue objectives in the nearterm, for the long-term effect would lead to higher revenues.
He recalled that in 2003, mobile telephony sector was reporting huge losses, resulting in
complete stoppage of all on-going investments. The entire sector was up in arms against each

13

As to why privatization did not occur until late 1990s, one can point to the reluctance of the Indian state to pursue
these changes because of resistance from entrenched and powerful interest groups tied to the state that benefited
from a closed economy and from planned development.
Initially telecommunications was a very low priority for government. When it did become a high priority,
investment was slowed by the efforts to develop an indigenous switch. Moreover, the stronger public sector
institutions of equipment makers and service providers also slowed privatization and other policy liberalization as
bureaucrats and labor unions and other beneficiaries of subsidies resisted reform.
14

Mobile telephone started in 1995-96 and 2002-03, reached a figure of 13 million, after 8 years of mobile
telephony. TRAI took certain steps in 2003-04 and this number increased to 33.6 million during the year, a growth
of 12.7 times the average growth in earlier years. India today envisions being able to reach 100 million mobiles by
2006, thereby achieving the 2010 target four years ahead of schedule.
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other, with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) 15 and the Government of India in
different courts.
TRAI took a number of steps that included, inter alia, the introduction of a revised
Interconnect Usage Charge (IUC) Regime, taking account of various comments about
sustainable competition in an increasingly converging environment; a pro-competition policy
with termination charges at low rates; the introduction of a reduced Access Deficit Charge
(ADC), bringing downward pressure on tariff; the introduction of a Calling Party Pays Regime,
again, making mobile service cheaper; the introduction of a Unified Licensing Regime, with
Unified Access Service License as a first step, providing flexibility to the operators to decide
and implement tariffs; a decision not to intervene in handset pricing while specifying that any
tariff schema must be available to subscribers irrespective of where they procure the handset; and
a planned transition to the new License regime for the operators.
Reg_1 explained that the TRAI focused on facilitating growth by enhancing competition
among operators, thereby enabling more affordable services to the consumers. He observed that
this regulatory environment, coupled with intense competition that ensued, had a major effect on
tariffs for mobile and national and international long distance calls, 16 and on innovative schemes
to offer mobile handsets.

Figure 2. Growth in cellular subscriber base
15

The Government of India set up a regulatory body, The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), in 1997,
ratified by an ordinance in 1998, ostensibly to set rates and mediate between service providers.
16 In 1999, the mobile peak tariffs were about Rs. 16 per minute, payable at both ends. They started coming down
from 1999 but yet were around Rs. 2 at the end of 2002-03. Despite huge reductions in tariff, the growth in numbers
was not explosive until 2002-03. During 1999 and 2003, the mobile numbers grew from 1.2 million to 13 million.
During 2003 and 2004, the mobile subscriber base increased by 20 million.
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As regards those court cases, they have all been withdrawn and as of 2004, the companies
are again investing huge amounts in expansion of networks. Reg_1 views 2003-04 as a
watershed year when the mobile tariffs became equal to fixed line tariffs and were affordable for
everyone. Refer to Figure 2 below. Reg_1 underscores the particular success of TRAI as the
Independent Regulator which allowed the telephones to be sold at unregulated and even
subsidized prices by the operators, thereby drastically bringing down the entry cost for
subscriber. Besides, with the introduction of new operators, competition in the market became
intense, with the public sector operator and the new operator becoming fiercely aggressive.
Speaking of the context of the limits or validity of the various ways of knowing and
learning, Reg_1 makes the further observation that with the above developments, mobile phones
that used to be exclusively for the elites suddenly became telephones for the working class, with
masons, electricians, plumbers, and other workers starting to buy them. Mobile phones became
so popular that within a year, the networks of most operators experienced bottlenecks with very
high capacity utilization. From a level of addition of about 0.2 million telephones a month in
April 2003, the growth jumped to 2 million telephones a month for April 2004. This growth was
beyond anybody’s expectation, which is why, Reg_1 observed, investment in creating new
capacities lagged behind. But the situation has changed for the better, as evidenced by the very
aggressive investment currently underway in 2005. What the regulators have come to realize is
that a further impetus is essential to sustain the progress in this area. This aspect is addressed
further under Knowing and Learning.
From the interview data it seems as if Reg_1 was objectivist, with the suitable form of
flexible regulatory process being acknowledged because of the behavioral scientists purposive
look for market behavior and theories. The author also found a development economist’s strand
in Reg_1’s interview data that seemed to interact with the objectivist epistemology. He was
looking for giving the right kind of regulatory response, the right answers to create a competitive
environment. There was also a pragmatic view for his choice of competition as a means to
achieve privatization. First, by instituting competition, Reg_1 thought the policy makers could
keep all privatization options open. Then, in his view, many concepts of privatization,
competition, liberalization, and regulatory reforms are very important in today’s society.
Knowing and Learning. Reg_1 compared China and India in terms of these two
countries population and performance parameters, taking into account certain non-telephony
sectors also. He prepared a table that showed that at the end of 2002, the ratio (per 1000
population) of television receiver between China and India was 3.8, cable TV 1.6, computers 3.3,
and for automobiles 1. Refer to Table 1. Then he compared these ratios with those of fixed and
mobile telephones to underscore that India’s performance in the telephone sector was below par
in relation to those other items which are also capital intensive, often requiring substantial
operating expenses.
Reg_1 observed that when one took into account the above disparities and the
comparative income levels and income distribution for China and India, one could see the
possibility of a major subscriber growth in the telecom sector. The only thing needed in India
was an environment conducive to such growth. Reg_1 hastened to add that by late 2003, growth
in Indian telephony was evident through mobile. He then wanted to focus on the performance in
that sector. According to Table 1, there was a huge difference between China and India’s mobile
teledensity at the end of 2002-03. The ratio was 16 in 2002, but due to higher relative growth of
mobile in India, this ratio was halved to about 8 and by the end of 2004, the ratio stood at ~6.
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From the Independent Regulator’s standpoint, Reg_1 was sure that removing the
impediments to growth in the Indian telecom sector and facilitating competition would bring
about a major growth stimulus in the market both from the supply as well as the demand side.
Reg_1 was pleased to state that the expectation underlying the various policy initiatives had
proven correct, as evidenced by an unprecedented spurt in subscriber growth as a consequence.
In his view, if TRAI continues to expand India’s mobile networks through policy
recommendations 17 that facilitate competition and growth, India will exceed the magical figure
of 100 million mobiles before the end of 2006.
Selected Indicators
Population (Billion)
Gini Index
Television Receiver (per 1000 population, 2002)
Cable TV (per 1000 population, 2002)
Computers (per 1000 population, 2002)
Passenger Cars + two wheelers (per 1000 population,
2002)

China India
1.30
1.05
0.4
0.38
193
78
60
37
19
5.8
33
34

Ratio of China/India
1.2
1.05
3.8
1.6
3.3
0.97

Subscribers per 1000 population
2002
Mobile
Fixed
Total

2003

China

India

Ratio

China

India

Ratio

161
167
228

10
38
48

16
4.4
4.8

214
209
423

27
40
67

8
5.2
6.3

Table 1. China vs. India comparison
Given that the monthly increase in subscriber base is currently slackening, Reg_1 also
expressed caution and outlined what he thought would be needed to reinvigorate the process. As
part of the knowing and learning, Reg_1 came to the realization that the existing progress in
reform should be supplemented by further policy efforts. He reiterated the fact that a key factor
triggering large growth at the end of 2003 was the sharp decrease in tariffs to relatively low and
more affordable levels.
Task Completion. Reg_1’s final observations in the last segment serve as the point of
departure for more thorough understanding and analysis of the potential for continued strong
growth. He provided a chart reproduced here with his permission that showed the monthly
subscriber additions to mobile and fixed line telephone since the beginning of 2004 (see figure
3). Reg_1 pointed out that after surging for a period, these monthly additions dipped low,
suggesting the need to analyze why the growth rate had slackened.
17 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was created by passing the TRAI Act in February 1997.
According to the Act, the role of TRAI is to advise the ministry on policy, solve disputes among serviced providers
and ensure that the rules and regulations governing business are followed. It is also the agency to intervene in case
market failures take place and protect consumer interests.
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Source: TRAI, 2005.

Figure 3. Monthly subscriber growth for mobile and fixed line telephones
Reg_1 noted that TRAI, at the time of launching the expansion drive, had examined the
size of the addressable market, which was calculated after looking at the household income of
different class of people and after assessing what the consumers were prepared to spend on
telecom. The addressable market was found to be 120 million. The Cellular Association of India
conducted a similar study in 2005 and projected an addressable market of 180 million, while yet
another service provider projected 150 million. Reg_1 pointed out that to this day, the number of
mobiles has only reached ~40 million and further growth has slowed down.
His understanding and knowledge tells him that the main reason behind slackening of
growth is that most operators in large parts of the country does not have available capacity.
Unless the operators spend substantial amounts in expanding the services, expansion is not going
to happen. Reg_1 mentioned Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) 18 as a classic example,
which does not have the capacity in many areas for giving more telephones. As a consequence,
BSNL often quotes its services at a premium to the declared price. In the final analysis, the
problem seems to be on the supply side, the demand does exist.
18

BSNL, formed on 1st October 2000, is a 100 percent Government of India owned Public Sector Undertaking. Its vision is to
provide all types of telecoms services across the length and breadth of the country.
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Reg_1 also pointed to a second reason for the slackening of growth: the extent of
network coverage for mobile service. In 2004, mobile networks of all operators covered ~1700
towns out of 5200 in the country. These 1700 towns accounted for a population of 200 million,
which has already acquired ~40 million telephones. Reg_1 highlighted that the penetration of 40
million mobile telephones out of a population of 200 million, half of which were added within
one year, was a very good performance. The average teledensity among the population covered
by the network in 2004 was already 20 percent.
Against this background, if TRAI has to achieve a target subscriber base of 100 million
by 2006, Reg_1 argued that the coverage of the existing mobile network must be expanded.
Under his leadership, TRAI therefore initiated a study of the investment plans of various
operators, including the steps that it must consider to facilitate a major network expansion in the
following years. The study revealed that the existing operators were encouraged by the huge
demand for mobile telephones all over the country and that they were planning a very aggressive
expansion of their networks. Reg_1 revealed that an examination of all the operators’ plans
showed that in two years time they would cover:
•
•
•

5000 towns, which would account for a population of 300 million
~350,000 villages out of 607,000 villages in the country, comprising a rural
population of 450 million.
Based on these figures, the population coverage by the mobile service would then be
about 75 percent.

Region
Africa

Americas

Arab States

Asia-Pacific

Europe

Country
Cape Verde
South Africa
Togo
Zambia
El Salvador
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Jordan
Morocco
Korea Rep.
Malaysia
The Philippines
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Czech Republic
Slovak Rep.

Population covered
by mobile signal
(percent)
90
93
90
50.5
85
86
68
89.9
99.5
95
99
95
70
94
72
99
98

Percentage of urban
population in country
(Percent)
53
53
38
44
45.6
63.6
40
74.7
78.7
55.9
84
62
58.6
50.8
70.7
71
56.1

Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database

Table 2. Mobile coverage beyond the urban population in selected countries, by region, 2002
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Reg_1 explained that TRAI reviewed the mobile coverage in other countries, primarily to
examine whether the above plans for coverage were sustainable. He referred to an ITU study
that showed that in 2002 countries in several regions, including Africa, America, Asia-Pacific,
and Europe, had much higher mobile network coverage. This was by far better than India’s 20
percent coverage in 2002 and 75 percent projected coverage likely to be in place in the next few
years. Refer to Table 2.
Reg_1’s position was that the extended coverage planned in India did not involve an
extra-ordinary plan and as one of the top policy advisors in the country, he recommended that
efforts be made to ensure that all constraints were removed so that the expansion plans could get
underway and be completed, as planned.
To complete the analysis, TRAI further supplemented the above analysis by an
examination of the teledensity in other countries whose Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per
capita income was similar to that of India. Reg_1 produced an international comparison chart
(see Table 3) that showed that there were, indeed, other countries in the world with similar per
capita income levels, but with much higher teledensity than that achieved by India. The table is
being reproduced here with permission. This table along with the previous two tables basically
convinced Reg_1 that if the network coverage could be increased to cover a larger portion of the
population, India should be able to achieve teledensity of more than 20 percent very quickly.
Country

GNI Per Capita PPP 2002, USD

India
Bolivia
Georgia
Moldova
Ecuador

2570
2300
2210
1560
3130

Teledensity
2002
2003
4.8
6.7
17.22
23.81
23.35
23.98
19.69
23.76
23.08
30.32

Source: TRAI, 2005

Table 3. International comparison: India’s per capita holds higher teledensity potential
Indian regulatory body, TRAI and its leadership, combined all the external analyses, their
own comparison of India and China, and the plans of the operators, especially how they were
formulating their investment strategies to extend their networks to provide wider coverage for a
much larger portion of the Indian population. Based on this concerted effort, TRAI came to the
realization that there was adequate potential for India to achieve the target of 100 million mobile
subscribers by 2006. TRAI wanted to make sure that there was no regulatory constraint put
before the operators to prevent them from meeting this important goal. Instead, as Reg_1
articulated very lucidly, TRAI learned a lot and gained significant knowledge about the network
operators’ interest in maximizing returns and how TRAI must address more complex preferences
shaped by multiple interest group pressures. In all this interaction of mobile operator/investors,
TRAI, and Government throughout the study, analysis and investment cycle, Reg_1, as one of
the top policy advisors in India, had to constantly meet the challenge posed by Kobrin (1979, pp.
67-80) to identify “which events matter” and how “regulatory processes affect investor
perception.” Reg_1 summed up TRAI’s learning and knowledge base by noting that regulatory
structures intended to bolster credibility play a critical role in securing new foreign and domestic
investment, especially when the sector in question, such as telecommunications, is “politically
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salient” as a result of economic, political, historical, or societal attributes that create a
widespread public interest in its operation or outcomes. Earlier this year when the author
interviewed Reg_1, he affirmed that TRAI under his leadership would focus on further
facilitating competition, tariff decline, and growth in telecoms. One important new phenomenon
that would emerge, observed Reg_1, if “we are able to promote the investment and network
coverage as envisaged through our analysis and planning, is that to a large extent we would be
able to substantially make progress on our Universal Service Objective (USO) of providing
phones on demand, and that too without incurring a subsidy through any USO Fund. This would
help us achieve the various positive externalities that such growth generates.” This remark
renders explicit the implicit preference of TRAI, that is, to make decisions that affect the
behavior of interest groups in ways that are consistent with regulatory policy choices for a
flexible and open regulatory environment conducive to sustaining advancement of
telecommunications technology and services and through that, economic development. TRAI is
obviously pursuing a solution-oriented path because as McDowell (1997) points out (cited in
Bagchi, 2000): “Policy formation in India is combined with highly developed and amorphous
consensus-building mechanisms among different state agencies…which prevent any shift in the
short-term towards an effective nationalist technology strategy or toward a distinct break and
movement toward a liberal policy order.”
Second Memo: India, View of Synergism
The author interviewed one of the highest ranking policy advisors in the World Bank. His
advisory work to Governments of India, China, and several other countries on
telecommunications sector reforms, regulatory frameworks and institutional capacity building
allowed him to compare and contrast the reforms underway in particular counties. To protect
his identity, this advisor would remain anonymous and for identifying him in this paper, we
would refer to him as Advisor 1 (Advsr_1).
Synergism. On the issue of universal access policy, Advsr_1 described the experience
gleaned by the Bank in India, China, and several other countries from 15 years of deploying rural
radio systems. He then offered assessments and conclusions for future plans made by India,
which he viewed was a unique and outstanding example of accomplishing the goals of universal
access policy without the wastage normally encountered in deliberately and mistakenly
deploying technology in rural areas.
Traditionally, telecom regulation in India has provided separate licensing Regimes for
different services, e.g., fixed line, mobile, Internet, long distance telephony, etc. With the
evolution of technology and market applications, most significantly the developments in Internet
and mobile technologies, Advsr_1 concurs with the other industry experts that the distinctions
traditionally applied among services are blurring and the same technology can now be used to
offer more than one type of service.
Thus, TRAI has recommended The Unified Licensing/ Authorization Regime through
which service providers may be able to offer any or all services, using technology of his/her
choice with flexibility also in terms of area of operation, greater participation of all types of
entrepreneurs (big or small). The Government of India has agreed in November, 2003 to
implement a Unified Licensing Regime under a two phase implementation scheme. The first
phase, implemented from November, 2003 onwards has put in place a Unified Access Licensing
(covering both fixed and mobile services) in India.
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TRAI is in its final phase for determining the recommendations for the second phase, i.e.
Unified Licensing, which will address several telecom services with separate licensing at present,
like National Long Distance Service, International Long Distance Service, VSAT Services,
Infrastructure Provider Services, Unified Access License, etc. These have different services
specific terms and conditions under their licenses. It is a big challenge to bring all these services
under a Unified Licensing Regime, while maintaining a level playing field and the objective of
adhering to high growth of telecom services.
However, Advsr_1 spoke very highly of the concept of Unified Licensing Regime, the
current status of Licensing Regime in India, the various concerns that need to be addressed for
ensuring a Unified Licensing Regime, and the way TRAI and the Government of India are
addressing those concerns. The point that Advsr_1 was making was that rural connectivity in
India or elsewhere would become a reality when one starts viewing the “Universal Service
Obligation” as “Universal Service Opportunity.” The Unified Licensing Regime encourages free
growth of new applications band services, reduces legal disputes on scope of license, ensures
flexibility and efficient utilization of resources, ensures level playing field and easy entry, and
encourages efficient small operators to cover rural, remote, and facility-wise less developed
areas. In sum, USO through its synergistic approach addresses all the requirements for universal
access requirements often levied upon the service providers, while making the approach
profitable. He underscored India’s experiment in this regard as exemplary.
Third Memo: China, View on Learning to Teamwork
COMMENT: For Understanding of Politically Mediated Framework
The author continued to interview Advsr_1. Again, having advised both the
Governments of India and China, he was able to make some observations on China’s recent
move toward a more open, competitive environment for its industrial expansion. In late 1940s,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s) Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
inherited functions from the Nationalist Chinese predecessor agency and became both the
regulator and national operating company, but other industrial branches of the government
manufactured telecommunications equipment. Over the first three decades of the PRC,
telecommunications generally grew at a slower pace than the rest of the economy. Until 1980,
the percentage growth of telephone exchanges consistently trailed that of both gross production
and national income. In most of these years (except the first decade) rural exchanges were the
most neglected.
In Advsr_1’s opinion, part of the reason telecommunications growth was relatively slow
may be found in the Chinese system of enclosed work units, or danwei. For urban residents in
particular, restrictions on place of work and movement meant relatively little need for
communication outside of a set workplace. Manufacturing was often done on a self-reliance
basis, with supply companies close to the assembly site. In the countryside, close-knit family ties
in villages also lessened the need for voice telecommunication. Finally, China's international
isolation under Mao Zedong meant phone calls outside of China were both less common and less
necessary than for other developing nations.
With the end of Mao’s era in 1976, however, China’s new regimes placed economic
development at the top of their agenda and the importance of telecommunications to
development was clearly reflected in spending decisions. Advsr_1 observed that studies of
telecommunications and their contribution to economic growth would have lent support to the
Chinese measures. One western study in 1981, later quoted in writing by a Chinese
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telecommunications official, indicated that a 1 percent rise in the number of telephones per 100
population could contribute to as much as a 3 percent increase in gross domestic product. The
study found that the telephone's role in improving the organization of economic activity led to
the subsequent growth. Accordingly, under China’s reformers, growth in several areas of
telecommunications exceeded that of the national economy over most of the first decade of
economic change.
Advsr_1 articulated several factors that inspired greater attention to telecommunications
development. The death of Mao and the subsequent turn toward "market socialism" meant a
greater need for rational and coordinated supply systems. Worker mobility also increased, and
the danwei structure began to weaken. Rural migration to the cities increased, and foreign
investors came to attract low-wage labour to new factories in many areas of the country. All of
these developments required a more developed system for both business and personal
communication. The government took several measures to address the perceived need.
For example, until the Chinese reformers arrived, revenue from telecommunications
operations was turned over to the central government, and the industry received a set percentage
of the budget (no matter what the receipts) for development. But beginning in 1980, the
government listed posts and telecommunications as a preferential construction item and allowed
the industry to use funds derived from its operations at national as well as local and collective
levels to supplement its development. By 1986, some 50 percent of the industry's revenue came
from this "self-raised" capital.
In 1984, then vice-premier Li Peng took control of the Leading Group for the
Revitalization of the Electronics Industry. Under this group's guidance, telecommunication was
put at a higher place on the government's agenda. The following year, MPT submitted a fifteenyear plan for telecommunications development to the State Planning Commission. The goals
were ambitious and were met ahead of schedule.
To support this trend, MPT policies, along with the growth of township and village
enterprises (TVEs), gave preference to the less developed regions of the country. 19 Additionally,
there were other telecommunications policies that were also key to the rapid change 20 .
Advsr_1 added that structural reorganization of the industry was also conducive to its
development. Before 1990, the provincial offices took direct orders from the MPT; since 1990,
however, the provincial branches have had autonomy in getting equipment, making investments,
planning, and accounting for their performance. (Refer to John Ure, Note 19)
The resulting decentralization has added to the industry's efficiency and the Chinese
began to realize the benefits of ending control by a state run monopoly and moving toward a
system of open competition in the sector. Several government institutions are still involved in the
policy development and implementation for the sector. That involvement also creates problems
19 The MPT officials claim that the ministry had a set ratio of investment, one that channeled funds from the more
developed coastal provinces to less developed areas such as Tibet and Qinghai (Ure, 1995).
Advsr_1 and several other China experts in the World Bank, however, think that even to this day some provinces
continue to lag behind the wealthier coastal areas.
20

In 1988, the "Three 90 Percents" strategy was inaugurated to benefit the MPT's drive toward development. This
policy stated that (1) 90 percent of central government loans for telecommunications did not have to be repaid; (2)
provincial telecommunications authorities could keep 90 percent of their taxable profits; and (3) the MPT could
keep 90 percent of its foreign currency earnings from international traffic. (Ibid.) The policy was quite successful
and was repealed by late 1995, as it was seen as no longer necessary.
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of industrial rivalry, the overlapping jurisdictions of regulation and operation within the MPT
and problems that foreign investors face in entering the operations part of the
telecommunications sector.
The author interviewed the former Assistant US Trade Representative and a senior
representative of the US-International Chamber of Commerce, who shared their experiences in
setting up China Unicorm. Again, to protect their identity, these advisors would remain
anonymous and for identifying them in this paper, we would refer to them as Advisor 2
(Advsr_2) and Advisor 3 (Advsr_3). Following their insightful analyses of the international
commercial diplomacy, the author also reviewed other secondary data sources to create a special
case study on China Unicom, which highlights the problems and issues that Advsr_1 mentioned
in his remarks.
Case Study: China Unicom. In addition to the reforms noted above, in the mid-1980s
the Chinese leadership had made moves to dilute the strength of powerful industrial ministries 21 .
As mentioned in the preceding section, MPT was the telecommunications monopoly and held
both operating and regulatory powers. There were two pressures to break the state monopoly on
telecommunications:
•
•
•
•

International pressures came from the:
World Bank, a key source of revenue
US Trade Representatives Office
US-International Chamber of Commerce.

All these institutions encouraged the broadening of market forces. The World Bank also
wanted to see the spread of telecommunications to rural areas in China, parts of the country
which the MPT was less eager to develop.
Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), which had manufactured equipment for the
industry but now wanted a piece of the operations. New minister Hu Qili led the fight to create a
rival to MPT operations control.
In course of time, the ministries of Electric Power Industry and Railways plus thirteen
other partners joined the MEI to officially open China United Telecommunications Corporation
(usually called Unicom) in July 1994. MEI, lacking its own telecommunications lines or wireless
systems, favored the alliance with the Power and Railway ministries, both of which had
substantial private telecommunications networks 22 .
The Unicom members together represent a potentially powerful array of stakeholders
meant to challenge the MPT monopoly. However, this is not to say that government control is
going to go away. A document released in the second week of January 2005 spelled out the role
communist party members inside big corporations should play in company management,
including serving as board members and choosing key executives. (“China Orders Bigger Role,”
21 For guidance in transforming the MPT, in 1988 the Chinese Academy of Sciences was asked by the State
Commission for Economic Restructuring to send scholars to the U.S. to find how the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) managed the telecommunications landscape following the breakup of AT&T. The investigators
particularly noted the effects of separate government regulation and private corporate operation.
22 The Chinese military, however, which also had its own wireless communication system, was absent from the list
of shareholders.
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2005) Bob Broadfoot of the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy in Hong Kong says, “The
party has really never gotten out of business.” (“China Orders Bigger Role”) He pointed out that
one sign of the party’s determination to keep a strong say in management came in 2004, when
the government ordered top executives at three major telecom operators , including Unicom, to
swap jobs. That was not a simple industry shake-up, rather a party shake-up, as Broadfoot saw it.
A vice president for AT&T Corp. in Hong Kong, Steve Lowe, who oversees the company’s
China operations, says that …the Chinese market will remain very regulated, very
controlled…We are frustrated. (Buckman, 2004)
Some of the big outfits like MCI and Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. currently offer
only limited services in China because the market is simply “too closed,” says David Lim,
managing director of SingTel’s greater China operations. Competition or market-liberalization,
as is known in other parts of the world has not happened yet in China. It is in this context that
Advsr_1, Advsr_2, and Advsr_3 remarked that China is the only country where competition is
witnessed not among the service providers operating in the Chinese market, but among more
powerful shareholders coming from the influential electronics, railways, and power ministries.
In sum, two things stand out in China's context. First, a coalition for restructuring
telecommunications with access to state's decision-making exists. The reform coalition consists
of a powerful group which includes, as noted above, the major manufacturing and user
ministries, large national users, local governments and interest groups and international
equipment suppliers 23 and service operators. Restructuring has, in turn, mostly benefited the
coalition partners. 24 This is evident from the networks available to powerful ministries,
equipment deals for Multi National Corporations, and availability of advanced services for users
in export-oriented areas such as Guangdong and Fujian.

Analysis
China is still at a relatively early stage of the regulatory and institutional transformation
of its telecommunications sector and thus cannot make unrealistic commitments to rapid open
market access and national treatment. The whole topic concerns massively shifting ground.
Appendix A is an attempt by the author to provide an early mapping of the institutional evolution
of China’s regulators and how these regulators address the ideational component to economic
regulation, i.e., the issue of telecoms competition and industry structure. Given that China is in
the midst of fashioning its own privatization, liberalization, and competition timetable for
telecommunications, it is worth noting that a number of developing countries, including India,
has already met and is on the way to exceeding WTO commitments, notably the Basic
23 The PRC permits foreign companies to sell advanced equipment to the country and to create joint ventures to
manufacture products within the nation's borders. Large corporations like AT&T (now Lucent Technologies),
Motorola, Siemens, NEC (Nippon Electronics Corporation) and other companies have taken advantage of this
policy. However, the Chinese government does not allow foreign companies to actually operate telecommunications
systems.
24 AT&T entered a Chinese joint venture four years ago, before Beijing joined the WTO, to provide Internet and
data services to companies. Steve Lowe, a vice president for AT&T Corp. in Hong Kong who oversees the
company’s China operations, says it has been successful, even though AT&T owns only 25 percent and the venture
can provide only limited services in one city, Shanghai.
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Agreement on Telecommunications. In Appendix A, India has been singled out for special
consideration.
Among the countries that committed to moderately restricted privatization, liberalization,
and competition plans, the example of India offers a number of useful parallels to the case of
China. 25 While China has made more rapid progress than India in expanding its
telecommunications infrastructure, both countries are classified as developing countries on the
strength of existing teledensity and numbers of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Both
countries have been making a slow shift from Ministry regulated and operated
telecommunications services to structural separation of regulation and operation. The
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is a newly formed entity. So is the
Ministry of information Industry (MII) in China. Both countries have taken their first steps
toward privatization, liberalization, competition by implementing policies in fixed line and in
cellular telephony. Both countries have pursued regional, provincial policies, in India’s case by
licensing duopolies in each of twenty service areas that essentially correspond to provincial
boundaries. In China, the PTAs have given rise to similar results.
With these comparisons in mind, Appendix A showing the Chinese and Indian
commitments provides useful background for comparing and analyzing the basis and the degree
and extent to which a country could commit to independence of regulatory functions and opening
to other market players. In what follows, we review China’s approach to telecommunications
reform based on broad themes and issues organized around the intersection of culture, society,
history, politics and economics in implementing the agenda of reform, with comparative
reference to India’s experience.
China
There has been a concerted effort in China to develop new regulatory institutions
responsible for setting conditions for the telecoms market. Indeed, Appendix A identifies the
sequence of events that clearly indicate that the PRC government is smack-dab in the middle of
an intensive effort to mold the foundations of its regulatory state, and is undergoing what Marc
Eisner (2000) calls “regulatory regime change:”
“A regime emerges when new regulatory policies are initiated in several regulatory issue
areas … and are combined with significant institutional changes. The policy initiatives
commonly display set of a related goals [sic] which transcends the specific problems of a given
industry. Moreover, the new administrative procedures often establish a common role for
economic interests in the definition and implementation of policy.” p. 3
As mentioned earlier, the whole topic concerns massively shifting ground in China,
including institutional change in the regulatory arena. Appendix A summarizes the facts that
economic interests surrounding this institutional change are rapidly shifting, too, as the country’s
drive to create domestically and globally competitive telecom industry intensifies. The new
regime contains elements –institutional and ideational – that are consistent with the global wave
of regulatory reform. Yet unique, if unsurprising, elements arise not only from the specific
historical-institutional context of the telecoms sector, but more generally from the continued
central role of state-ownership, the revenue imperative of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and
the development goals of the Chinese government. China’s regime is therefore a mixed bag, as
well as evolving at a rapid pace.
25 For more detailed discussion, see Kaushik (1997) and Jain (1997).
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Ideationally, there is a commitment in China to break up the state-owned incumbent
monopolies. The goal is to ensure greater productivity by promoting some market competition in
telecoms by promoting market entry by a handful of officially licensed firms. However, rather
than simply creating a level playing field for any firm that wishes to enter and exit, the Chinese
government is actively structuring the competition. Appendix A summarizes that the
government has promoted a pattern that breaks up the monopoly incumbent, China Telecom, into
five dominant, state-owned firms, and in some situations permitted a few more marginal players
but not supported them. 26 There is much discussion of the need for markets and competition, but
they must be stable.
There also has been a greater effort at codification of rules. The subject of much of the
earlier codification was “social regulation” needed to achieve social policy such as continuing
the inflow of revenues from large state enterprises, as well as the provision of universal services
(standard worldwide in telecommunications). Although the universal services commitment is
explicit in discussions of telecom development programs, the need for the Chinese state
incumbents to help serve social aims such as employment has not often been discussed but is
nevertheless important. One important result of this imperative is that, for the Chinese
regulators, it is impossible to not care which players survive and how well they do – hence the
revenue imperative.
To support these regulatory aims, Appendix A summarizes how the Chinese government
has attempted to make some institutional changes. New institution includes substantially
revised line ministry – notably the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).
Also, there are moves to generate “independence” for regulators through the effort to
separate the government regulatory function from business. This addresses the classic problem
of “capture” of regulators by business. While this separation has been on the agenda for many
years, an additional major step was made in the 1998 reorganization of the State Council in the
effort to reorganize functions and eliminate the line ministry or reduce it to bureau. 27
Independence is circumscribed in three main ways. First, the regulators are not
“independent” of policy-making bodies. The policy importance of the social-revenue imperative
dictates the need to maintain political oversight over the regulators. Hence, the role of
comprehensive agencies [notably State Development Planning Commission (SDPC)/ State
Development & Reform Commission (SDRC)] as well as political bodies (State Council and
Party) remains significant. China’s reforming regulatory system sustains much governmental
control.

26 As Table A-1 referenced, the PRC permits foreign companies to sell advanced equipment to the country and to
create joint ventures to manufacture products within the nation’s borders. The Chinese government, however,
prohibits foreign companies from actually operating telecommunications systems. Foreign phone companies such as
Ameritech, Deutsche Telecom, Sprint and others are thereby limited in their participation. As noted in the table, the
Chinese preferred to keep revenue from operating these systems to themselves.
27 It was beyond the scope of Table A-1 to list all the details, but the massive reorganization of the State Council
was carried out by Zhu Rongji upon becoming premier in 1998. That reorganization created the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII), which oversees telecommunications policy and regulation, as a merger between the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). It became a
“superministry” and also was marked to become the “independent regulator” for telecom. A part of the impetus for
the formation of MII was to try to break apart the regulator, previously MPT, from the incumbent, China Telecom,
as MPT had shown complete favoritism for China Telecom over the competitor formed in 1994, China Unicom.

© 2006 Sprouts 6(4), pp 166-220, http://sprouts.case.edu/2006/060406.pdf
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/6-7

190

MAITRA/ASIAN MOBILE SERVICES

Second, there is a fundamental problem of ensuring that new institutions actually have
authority. Just because there is a new regulatory body does not mean the regulated (or other
former regulators) will pay attention to it. Moreover, other government bodies that previously
may have had a regulatory role may not have been explicitly excluded from the mix (so that a
new regulator is just one player in the system of fragmented authoritarianism) or may simply
refuse to relinquish rights to have a say on certain issues.
Third, and related, ownership rights over state-owned enterprises are not clear. 28 What
does it mean for MII to be an “independent regulator” of China Telecom, which is “100%
owned” by the Ministry of Finance? How are the jurisdictional lines maintained? Thus far, not
very well.
These points suggest that considerable “regulatory risk” remains in the Chinese system.
Foreign players planning to enter the Chinese market often express their fear about the lack of
clear and concise legislation governing the sector, regulatory implementation and enforcement,
true competition, and regulatory independence.
India
India and China are pursuing diametrically opposed strategies across most salient
dimensions of national telecoms strategy. Appendix A chronicles the evolution of the two
different strategies and highlights their contrasts. What's the fastest route to economic
development? Welcome Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), says China, and most policy experts
agree. But a comparison with long-time laggard India suggests that FDI is not the only path to
prosperity.
Since 1991, the Government of India (GOI) has introduced a series of economic reforms,
including policies of privatization, competition, liberalization and regulatory independence in the
telecoms sector. The broad thrust of the new policies was a move away from the centralized
allocation of resources in key sectors, including telecoms, by the government to allocation by
market forces. Private participation in economic development has emerged as an alternative to
the state-oriented development strategy in the reform period.
The shift in attitude, summarized in Appendix A, was a belated realization by
government of the poor performance of the telecoms enterprise and the new policies were
instituted to bring market discipline and public accountability to the performances of the national
telecom enterprise, the Department of Telecommunication (DoT), by broad basing their
management and ownership patterns. Also, the table describes the fact that after a decade of
reforms, restraints to competition such as state monopolies and protective measures and controls
are being replaced by relatively more competitive and de-regulated open telecoms environment.
In setting up the specific independent regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India (TRAI), the government has actively coordinated between agencies even in the early stages
of competition and taken an active role in redefining their position as regulators in the previous
policy regime. Appendix A chronicles how the sequencing and timing of establishing TRAI has
depended on domestic compulsions and needs.
One particular urgent need that existed in India in the late 1980’s-early 1990’s timeframe
was to address legacy issues so that commonplace and relevant consumer applications could
emerge and radical social and economic changes could be effected. Some likely applications
28 Although discussion of property rights in academic and policy literature is often treated normatively –i.e., private
property is preferable – the point here is that ambiguity about who owns and has use/profit rights to assets (whether it
be “the state” or private owners or something else) lays the groundwork for ambiguous rules.
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included acceleration of literacy and education rates in the general public and consequent
improvement in real income, and job creation through encouragement of viable small
entrepreneurial business enterprises at the grassroots level. In the late 1980’s, the prevailing
thinking was that these enterprises would principally operate in the services sector, expanding it
to the manufacturing. From the government point of view, this would result in a rapid widening
of the direct tax base without necessitating a corresponding rise in government staffing. Income
from direct telecom revenues was not expected to be much, thus reinforcing the government
policy of expanding capacity through the private sector.
Appendix A traces the beginning of the process by which India spawned a number of
telecoms companies that now compete internationally with the best that Europe and the United
States have to offer. Moreover, today, many of these firms are in the most cutting edge,
knowledge-based industries. In 2003, the Forbes 200, an annual ranking of the world’s best small
companies, included 13 Indian firms but just four from mainland China. But when it comes to
gross domestic product (GDP) figures and other headline numbers, India is still no match for
China.
However, the statistics tell only the macroeconomic story. At the micro level, things look
quite different. By relying primarily on organic growth, the Indian policy experts have been
following a path that is today beginning to deliver more sustainable progress, even though the
path is different from China’s FDI-driven approach.
The fact that India chose to build from ground up while China is still pursuing a topdown approach reflects their contrasting political systems: India is a democracy, and China is
not. But the different strategies are also a function of history. China’s Communist Party came to
power in 1949 intent on eradicating private ownership, which it quickly did. India, on the other
hand, developed a softer brand of socialism, Fabian Socialism, which aimed to mitigate the
social ills that capitalism caused. However, as Appendix A documents, that did not prevent
entrepreneurship (e.g., the creation of the Center fort the Development of Telematics [C-DoT])
from flourishing where the long arm of the state could not reach.
Competition policy covers all aspects of government actions that affect the conditions
under which firms compete and is considered as complex in its intentions and effects. Appendix
A records that one of the major objectives of the National Telecom Policy (NTP) announced in
1994 was to “Transform in a time bound manner, the telecommunications sector to greater
competitive environment in both urban and rural areas providing equal opportunities and level
playing field for all entrepreneurs”. Prior to NTP 99 this did not appear to be an explicit
objective of the reform process. Private sector entry was to be tolerated only in order to add to
the government’s investment in the telecom sector. This was apparent from the fact that the
liberalization of the telecom sector in India was initiated with several restrictions on entry. Then,
the TRAI was set up “to facilitate competition, … to provide a level playing field for fair
competition among the public and private operators and to give further content to universal
service obligation.” (Economic Survey, 1997, p. 169) Then, following TRAI’s assessment of
expected levels of competition in cellular mobile services and their fast growth, the Indian
government decided to follow an approach of free and unlimited entry. The comparison in
Appendix A indicates that the rough-and-tumble Indian telecoms market has moved slowly and
steadily up the value chain and has been able to capitalize on entrepreneurial energies and
innovations.
China’s leadership is still not willing to relinquish its control over the largest SOEs such
as China Telecom. Instead, the government has ferociously protected them from competition.
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More than a few promising businesses have been destroyed this way. This bias against
homegrown firms is widely acknowledged. 29
In the political economy context of India, not only is entrepreneurship thriving in India
but democracy, a tradition of entrepreneurship, and a decent legal system have given India the
underpinnings necessary for free enterprise to flourish.
Appendix A covers many more specific telecoms privatization, competition, and
regulatory independence issues. It is not necessary to discuss each area separately. The real issue
is that India and China have pursued radically different development strategies, and Appendix A
notes that India is not outperforming China overall, but it is doing better in certain key areas.
China is keeping the doors to foreign telecommunications companies tightly shut. The
government still maintains a ministerial monopoly of communications services, restricts foreign
investment and control and has, until recently, been slow to expand service to rural areas.
Privatization has not been allowed and does not appear to be in the offing for the Chinese
telecoms industry in which competition is primarily between government entities, vying for
authority.
Countries often use privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sector to
signal their seriousness about instituting pro-market reforms. Unless important reform measures
are further enhanced, China’s program may retard the sector’s growth and through that the
country’s economic developmental goals. India’s success confirms that the telecommunications
sector offers substantial positive externalities for the economy as a whole 30 and that kind of
success may enable India to catch up with and perhaps even overtake China in the economic
development ladder. Should that prove to be the case, it will only demonstrate the importance of
particular country political, developmental and social circumstances that foster entrepreneurship
and through that long-term economic development; it will also show the limits of the FDIdependent approach that China is pursuing.

Conclusions and Future Issues
The analysis presented in the preceding section reveals that privatization and
competition had a large positive impact on telecommunications performance in both India
and China and that more reforms were associated with more performance gains.
Full privatization, which gave private owners control rights in India, were much
more effective in improving performance than partial privatization, which left control
rights in the hands of bureaucrats in the Indian Department of Telecommunication. The
Indian case history also suggests that privatization works best when there is competition
that limits the market power of the incumbent(s). Competition could thus be a complement
to privatization. More recent research by the author includes a vector of these
telecommunications reforms (i.e., reform measures).
India also experienced faster network expansion and improvements in both labor
and total factor productivities (TFP). Because of the greater incentives to innovate and save
costs, the Indian telecommunication sector, particularly the mobile service sector,
29 A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Report issued in 2000 concluded that because of longstanding prejudices
and mistaken beliefs, private and individual enterprises have a lower political status and are discriminated against in
numerous policies and regulations. “The legal, policy, and market environment is unfair and inconsistent.”
30

For more understanding of these externalities, refer to Roller & Waverman (2001).
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experienced higher TFP after privatization. The increase in competitive pressure was
associated with rising investment, teledensities, decreasing price for a three-minute offpeak hour local cellular phone call cost, and similar other performance measures. Given the
lack of telecommunications infrastructure in many developing countries, one of the main
yardsticks in measuring the success of telecommunications reforms should, therefore, be
the pace of network and services expansion and the concomitant lowering of price for a
three-minute off-peak hour local cellular phone call cost. The number of mobile phone
lines per 100 inhabitants (Mobile_Densitry) and the price of a three-minute off-peak hour
local cellular phone call cost (CELLCALLCOST) are, therefore, good candidates for
outcome measures.
The Indian and Chinese case histories provide useful evidence of complementarities
between privatization and competition in deepening network penetration. China did not
allow any privatization, which should lead one to investigate further the country specific
effects.
In both case histories, there were references to a time trend to gauge the effects of
technological changes, which, as the Indian case suggests, were statistically significant
given the rapid adoption of new technology in the mobile sector in the late 1990’s. The
country fixed effects are key parameters to represent country-specific heterogeneity, which
influences both policy changes and sector performance. Again, the more recent research by
the author specifies a measure to account for time trend. Additionally, the country
economic environment, as we saw in both India and China, affect the demand and supply
of telecommunications services and hence telecommunications outcomes.
Figure 4 illustrates how all these measures and variables that emerge from this
research phase are related to each other, and Appendix B catalogs them for further
refinement.
The most important conclusion to draw from this paper is that there is solid
evidence that privatization “generally” works for privatizing economies as a whole. Case in
point is the Indian telecommunications privatization: it has resulted in increased
productivity and reduced employment; and proved that the fears of negative overall effects
at the economy level are not necessarily justified. As one discusses privatization, the point
to stress is that the benefits of privatizations depend on market institutions being in place.
For instance, India vigorously instituted property rights protection and the rule-of-law,
imposed budget constraints, increased competition, and attempted transparency in
governance, thereby reaping the largest benefits in a very small amount of time. The
biggest concern that many foreign investors have about China is that appropriate
institutions are not in place and consequently, these foreign investors anticipate less
dramatic performance improvements for the of the Chinese economy. Privatization in
China is slow in coming, however, foreign investors are making positive impacts in that
even partial foreign equity ownership, particularly in the equipment manufacturing sector,
exhibits the highest productivity bidding process. China is carefully allocating the foreign
equity ownership in the equipment manufacturing business. China’s strategy seems to be
geared toward receiving a high price for all joint venture/co-production agreements because
it is important for fiscal reasons. Potentially, such high prices would generate other
favorable impacts: they might ensure the political legitimacy of emerging private property
rights and the continued evolution of reforms that foreign investors so eagerly seek in
China.
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Figure 4. Relationship of the key measures/variables
To translate the above observations into policymakers’ language, the lessons from
this paper’s privatization research are:
•
•
•

Privatization can deliver substantial benefits. In some cases productivity doubles; in
other cases productivity can increase by single percentage points.
Privatization usually causes either no change or reduction in employment. Based on
experience, it seems that most privatizing countries manage this problem reasonably
well.
Policy trade-offs are better handled when privatization is attained under transparency
and openness to foreign investors. Often there are pressures from insiders and
domestic investors against allowing participation by foreign entities, along with
strong nationalistic fervor. However, disallowing foreign ownership always lowers
privatization prices, with attendant decreases in post-privatization efficiency.
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•

Privatization works well, if good institutions are present. China and Russia are not
outliers. China’s growth has come from private sector development and the empirical
evidence from China suggests that non-privatizing reform measures, such as market
liberalization and increase use of incentives can improve the efficiency of SOE.
However, foreign investors opening up beach-heads in China argue that these reforms
would yield greater dividends if the government allowed privatization. Russia lacks
good institutions, however, the demand for institutions has started to emerge. The
pace is slower than expected, mostly due to macroeconomic instability and/or
inequality and illegitimacy of property rights. Many Russia experts argue that there is
no better alternative because openness to foreigners is not an acceptable political
position attitude.

Avenues for Further Research
The foregoing observations reveal much that has been learned about the
effectiveness of privatization as a political and economic policy. However, there are several
important areas that need further investigation. In particular, there are three aspects of
privatization that need better analysis for public policy reasons:
•

•

•

First, researchers need to conduct more thorough research on the sequencing and
staging of privatization and document if reforms other than government divestiture
can be a substitute or precursor for privatization. Until such policy findings are
identified, the interactions between several different policy options are established,
and conclusively documented, launching large-scale privatization programs remains a
leap of faith.
The second vital area of research concerns the labor economics of privatization
programs. The question all too often raised is: do most privatization programs cost
SOE employee jobs? How effective are the employee training/retraining programs in
terms of dealing with worker redundancies? Can we put any credence to the idea that
privatization creates more jobs economy-wide than it destroys? These questions are
vitally important to policy makers, interesting in their own right, and should be
conclusively researched and documented in order that responsible policy makers can
make sensible choices and not just “bet their economies” on a rapid and essentially
irreversible privatization program.
Finally, in terms of the current state of the world, one should address the question:
what role can privatization play in equipping countries to meet the challenges posed
by major economic forces such as globalization and the rapid growth of informationbased business? Technological breakthroughs are transforming the global
telecommunications industry, with privatized telecommunications companies playing
a definite role at the forefront of this revolution. Can one say that this most dynamic
of industries would have been able to grow as rapidly under the previous state
ownership model? Beyond that, one can also look at other industries and ask related
questions, such as how important will privatization be for the global oil and gas
industry’s development in the future, or what about the energy-based utilities that are
now being impacted by technological and regulatory changes like those that impacted
telecommunications in the late 1990s? Then there is the question of influencing the
developing countries: how should they structure privatization programs to most
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effectively attract foreign direct investment from multinational companies? These are
pertinent questions that can and should be answered using economic analysis tools.
There isn’t any research more intrinsically interesting to economists than the one that
analyzes the optimal role of government in the business of nations.
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Appendix A. Comparative Analysis of Competitiveness of Telecommunications Industry in India and China
Attribute

1.

Intersection of
Society, Culture,
and Politics

India

China

Aspect

References

Aspect

1947
¾ There were
only 321 switching
centers (telephone
exchanges) in
urban areas and a
teledensity of 0.25
phones per 1,000
people.
Until Mid-1980s
¾ All aspects of
the telecoms sector
under government
control thru the
Ministry of Posts
and Telegraph as a
national monopoly.
¾ Telephones
centered around
the
urban and
metropolitan areas
and rural coverage
lacking because of
“the perception that
phones were a
luxury and rather
than essential
infrastructure for
efficient
administration of
government and
industry.” 31

Mody, B. (1995).
State
Consolidation
through
liberalization of
Telecom; Journal
of
Communication
45(4), page 109110

1949

Ibid. p.111
Also, refer to:

¾

McDowell,
Stephen D.
(1997).
Globalization,
Liberalization
and Policy
Change: A
Political
Economy of
India’s
Communications
Sector,
Macmillan’s
Press, p. 128.

¾

There were
only 300,000
phones for about
550 million
people, i.e., one
phone for every
1,800 residents.
In rural areas,
there were only
about 30,000
phones for every
18,000 Chinese.
The People’s
Republic of
China's Ministry
of Posts and
Telecommunicati
ons (MPT)
inherited
functions from
the Nationalist
Chinese
predecessor
agency and
became the
country's
monopoly "Posts
and
Telecommunicati
ons
Administration"
(PTA). 33

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References
For early history
of the industry,
refer to:
¾ Dangdai
zhongguo de
youdian shiye
(China's current
Posts and
Telecommunicati
ons Industry).
(1993). Beijing:
Dangdai
zhongguo
chubanshe, pp.
9-18.
¾ China
Telecommunicati
ons Construction
(hereafter CTC),
vol. 1, no. 4
(November/Dece
mber 1989), p.
13.

For details on this
type of
communication,
refer to:
¾ T. C. Yu,

Most of the telephones in the countryside
were for military commanders, leaving
virtually no telephones for residential
use.
MPT was both the regulator and national
operating company, but other industrial
branches of the government
manufactured telecommunications
equipment.
Early development of the
telecommunications industry in China
was tied closely to the growth of the
nation's economy.

Public pressure mounted and
Parliamentary questions were raised
about the:
¾ Inadequacy of the level of
service
¾ High prices
¾ Unavailability of telephones.
Industry experts, at this stage,
argued that the different
technological needs of the postal

31 Stephen McDowell in his treatise of political economy of the communications sector in India observes: Telecommunications technology and services did not
assume a high national priority until the Seventh Economic Development Plan (1985-90). It is widely claimed the telecommunications were seen by policy makers
up until the early 1980’s as luxury services not essential to essential to economic growth. But there might have been other reasons, too. An Indian commentator
argued in 1981 that the urban bias was dictated by the fact that: The direct and tangible benefits of telecommunications expansion in rural areas being small, there has
been a tendency so far to leave those areas alone and concentrate on urban areas, which give handsome returns to capital. Until 1980’s, the essential components of
telecommunication service policies, where a telephone network was not in place, were policies for producing and purchasing network equipment, for funding
network expansion, and for organizing public organizations to provide telecommunication services.
32 The ministry attempted to damp down the criticism, however, telecommunications remained a focal point of public debates between 1980-1983. McDowell
writes: “The importance of telecommunications had risen in the administration of Prime Minister India Gandhi in the early 1980’s and was accentuated in the new
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Attribute

India
Aspect
1981
¾ A highpowered
government
committee
reviewed
organizational
issues at the
Ministry of Posts
and Telegraph
¾ The committee
recommended:

1.

Splitting the
MPT into two
divisions

2.

Immediate
importation of
100,000
telephone
instruments

China

References

¾

Ibid, p.

¾
¾

Ibid, p. 133
Ibid, p. 140

132.

3.

Collaboration
with foreign
telecom
companies.
¾ Despite
everything, the
telecommunication

Aspect

¾

Early days
of communism:
The number of
telephones was
limited, but there
were methods of
"mass
communication,:”
including radio,
film, newspapers
and dazibao (bigcharacter
posters).
¾ These
forms of
transmitting
information were
naturally
unidirectional,
i.e., from
government
propagandists to
the masses.
¾ For political
purposes,
however, these
methods,
coupled with the

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References
Frederick. (1963)
“Communications
and Politics in
Communist
China,”
Communications
and Political
Development, ed.
Lucian Pye.
Princeton:
Princeton
University Press,
pp. 259-97.

and telecommunications activities
necessitated a break and that such a
break would allow greater attention
to be paid to telecommunications
role in development.
In the face of mounting criticism, the
bureaucrats began defending
themselves. McDowell quoted the
chief telecom bureaucrat, the
Secretary of Communications, S. K.
Ghosh, as saying in 1983, “Telecom
investments deserved the priority
given the economic fall-outs in other
sectors, but surpluses were being
siphoned off to cover the postal
deficit.” Refer to McDowell, p. 133

¾ Birth of the Department of
Telecom (DoT)

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated
the liberalization of the telecom
sector by demonopolising the
telecom equipment-manufacturing
sector in 1985, allowing private firms
to manufacture telephones.
Meanwhile, DoT licensed switching

government of Rajiv Gandhi who became prime minister in 1984. The telecommunication policy model that emerged at this time in India, combined some
liberalization of imports of computer and information technology with the allocation of more state resources to develop national telecommunications equipment
research and development capabilities.” (see McDowell 1997, P. 136.)
33 Developing countries tend to follow a distinct pattern: First, they leave overall control of the telecoms sector in the hands of a central government agency, one that
is sometimes combined with postal services to create the generically named "Posts and Telecommunications Administration" (PTA) . The PTA is usually at a
ministry or executive agency level in the political hierarchy, and is the monopoly operator and very often the monopoly regulator and equipment manufacturer.
Through the PTA, the government can ensure uniform standards, coordinated purchases of equipment and regulated development in all parts of the nation. The
existence of a PTA, however, also means that competition is suppressed, and the key industry is usually managed by public bureaucrats rather than by private
entrepreneurs. Secondly, the monopoly agency, through protectionism, tends to shut out foreign competition. Often, issues of national security are raised to defend
this position; in fact, what is behind this smokescreen is the lucrative income to be gained by operating a communications system (and sometimes manufacturing its
equipment). Finally, developing nations mostly focus on urban growth in their initial stages of telecommunications deployment. Large cities are natural targets:
residents are wealthier and better sources of revenue, infrastructure and physical layout for installing wires and cellular transmission equipment are more hospitable,
and urban areas serve as showcases of the nation's development. Only conscious efforts by government regulators can encourage the development of universal
nationwide service.
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Attribute

India
Aspect

China

References

1.

Aspect
introduction and
rapid spread of
television in the
1970s and
1980s, were
sufficient to
convey
information; the
lack of
telephones was
no hindrance to
keeping people
informed of the
news and policy
statements that
the government
considered vital.

s bureaucracy was
not convinced:
The MPT was
more
concerned
with
defending its
turf against
the newly
formed
Department
of
Electronics. 32

1986

¾

A long sought
re-organization was
undertaken to split
the public postal
and telecom
operations into
separate
departments.

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References
technology from various foreign
firms.
Rajiv Gandhi also gave a thrust to
national development of
telecommunications equipment by
hiring a non resident Indian engineer
in 1984 to start the Center for the
Development of Telematics (C-DoT).
The goal: To design an indigenous
digital telecommunications switch,
which would suit the
C-DoT was to produce smaller rural
exchange switches as well as a new
bigger capacity switch, which would
form the core technology for the
geographical expansion of
telecommunications services.
This possibility of indigenous
manufacturing led to a slowdown in
purchases of other technologies and
slowed down construction of new
manufacturing facilities based on
foreign technologies. The plans of CDoT were, however, affected by the
election of the new minority
government in 1989, which
immediately ordered a review of
C-DoT’s technology and operations.

¾

There was a broad agreement in the
government that given the country’s
perilous balance of payments
position, it was better to try and
develop indigenous technology than
buy it from foreign firms. Thus, the
government panel gave a favorable
review of C-DoT.

Outcome

Public Accounts
Committee of the
Lok Sabha (Lower
House of the
Parliament)
recommended a
complete overhaul
of
telecommunication
s, “which was
working in a most

¾

Ibid, p. 140

This result: No
private carriers
and all investment
in the sector
came from the
national
government's
budget.
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By the late 1980’s, the government
was attaching greater importance to
the goal of expanding
telecommunication services than it
did in the first part of the decade.
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Attribute

India
Aspect

References

China
Aspect

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References

unsatisfactory
manner in 1985.”
2.

Development of
the New Economy

Late 1980’s
A multitude of
factors were
impacting the way
telecom policy was
being formed:

¾

1.

Greater
importance to
the goal of
expanding
telecoms
services
compared to
the first part
of the
decade;
2.
Reliance on
organic
growth: India
decided to
design and
build an
indigenous
telecommunic
ations switch
to suite the
unique Indian
environmenta
l conditions –
one that
could work
thru extreme
variations of
temperature,
humidity, and
dust, and
whose
manufacture
would be
licensed to
private firms.
1990s
¾ The interests
of the state took
precedence over
those of other
interests groups
like users,
manufacturers and
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Bottom-up Approach
India managed to spawn a number
of companies that soon began to
compete internationally with the best
that Europe and the United States
have to offer.
India is making fuller use of its
resources and has chosen a path
that may well deliver more
sustainable progress than China’s
FDI-driven approach.

Top-down Approach

Telecoms Policy announcement
delayed until the end of 1991.
-- Strong opposition of the
Department of Telecommunications
(DoT) bureaucrats and labor unions,
who threatened by job loss, united to
oppose any changes in the state
monopoly.
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Attribute

India
Aspect

References

China
Aspect

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References

international
telecom firms.
New Economic and
Industrial Policy 1991
Broad guidelines
for foreign equity
investment and
foreign venture laid
out in Prime
Minister’s New
Economic Policy in
June 1991.
Outcome

Process of
accommodation
and negotiation
with local and
foreign forces gave
national economic
policy a distinctive
pace, sequence
and form.

3.

Tentative First
Steps:
Constrained
Competition

4.

Gradualism

The National
Telecom Policy of
1994 announced a
series of specific
targets to be
achieved by 1997.
It recognized that
government
financial resources
would be
inadequate to
achieve these
targets and
concluded that
private investment
was required to
bridge the resource
gap.
In 1997, an
independent
regulator, the
Telecom
Regulatory
Authority of India
(TRAI), was finally
constituted, but has

1 Professor
Sidharth Sinha,
Indian Institute of
Management,
Ahmedabad,
India

In anticipation of
liberalization
commitments of
its accession to
the WTO, China
took tentative first
steps by
beginning to
introduce
competition in
1994 and more
major reforms
were undertaken
beginning in
1998.

Crishna,
Vickram. 1999.
Telecommunicati
ons in India.
India Telecom
Country Paper,
Workshop on
Internet : South
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India is not outperforming China
overall, but it is doing better in
certain key areas. That success may
enable it to catch up with and
perhaps even overtake China.
DoT compromised with state-tied
interests and announced:
“all services other than basic
telephony, termed value-added,
would be provided by private sector
companies only and DoT would
concentrate on telephony and their
extension to rural areas.*4
Government invited private sector
participation in a phased manner.

Constraints in terms of artificial
differentiation between local and
long-distance (even international)
connectivity were removed so that
the power of the Internet paradigm
could be realized for grassroots
development.

In 1994, China United
Telecommunications Corporation
(Unicom) was created to improve service
quality by introducing managed
competition. Pricing policies, such as
service fee remained under MPT, and
individual operators were not able to
compete through price mechanism.

The government worked on system
reforms for the MII and introduced the
necessary legislation to be in compliance
with their WTO commitments, notably the
Basic
Agreement on Telecommunications
(BAT). Work on a telecommunications
law has been ongoing since 1986 and
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Attribute

Outcome

5.

Toward Two
Economies:
Macro-economic

India
Aspect

References

been embroiled in
controversy ever
since, as the
government has
been unable to
reconcile itself to
losing control.
Initially, TRAI is
empowered to set
telephony rates but
not the terms and
conditions for
setting up
telecommunication
services. Rates for
telephony and
rentals have been
revised to reduce
cross-subsidies
between longdistance (national)
and local
telephony.
The new telecom
policy had
strengthened TRAI
by awarding it the
power of arbitration
between
government and
private service
providers. It also
laid down a
framework for
permitting
interconnection
between any
networks, at costs
that each would
set. The purpose
was to allow
services to define
their business
models
pragmatically in
terms of retail or
institutional
markets.
New
Telecommunication
s Policy 1999

Asian Realities
and
Opportunities
Dhaka, April 5-8,
1999, Session I.
Telecom
Policies,
Regulations and
Infrastructure
Monday, 5 April,
99, 13:45-15:30

China
Aspect

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References
begun by the former MPT. Meanwhile,
bureaucratic reforms that have gone on
in tandem with industry reforms, which
increased the number of new players,
and rapid changes in technology, have
forced revisions of the drafts before they
were even issued. As a result the
telecom industry has been to date
governed by an ad hoc set of regulations.
While the law appears to be still several
more years in the making, a long-awaited
provisional Telecommunication
Regulation was issued in September of
2001 in line with its World Trade
Organization (WTO) commitments in the
Telecoms sector.

1949 – 1977:
Telecommunicati
ons’ role in the

1. L. Jintong, L.
Xiongjian, and W.
Yan,

Private sector entry was slower than
what was envisaged in NTP 1994.*

These regulations and some follow up
regulations are a very important first step
towards developing a comprehensive
and pro competitive regulatory
framework, but there remain many issues
of interpretation, clarity and
implementation, and some areas which
have not been adequately addressed.
Moreover, as they are only regulations,
they do not have the full effectiveness
that a true Telecommunications Law
would have.

NTP-1999’s stated objectives were
to "Transform in a time bound
manner, the telecommunications

These policies ended the long period of
slow development of
telecommunications. But there was

34 Ministry of Information Industry
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Attribute

India
Aspect

Reforms without
Redistributive
Change

References

(NTP-1999)

China
Aspect

References

national economy
was not
recognized
correctly.
Since 1978,
Chinese
telecommunicatio
ns has been
developed
gradually in four
stages:
1.
1978-1984
To meet the
needs of
economic
development, the
State Council
offered special
telecoms policies,
such as low
taxes.
▼
2.
1984–1989
Chinese economy
grew rapidly and
the demands for
telecommunicatio
ns increased
speedily.
▼
3.
1989-1997
Foundation of
China Unicom in
1993
▼
4.
1998Present
Foundation of
MII 34 in 1998, and
the reconstruction
of China Telecom
in 1999-2001.
After the
reorganization in
May 2002, the
new “5-1”
structure was
introduced,
thereby
establishing
China Telecom,

Telecommunicati
ons in China:
Development and
Prospects. Nova
Science, 2001
2. Y. Hui,
“Regulation
System of China’s
Government,” in
China Posts and
Telecommunicati
ons 2002 Annual
Report, Beijing,
MPT, 2003, pp.
93-103, 1998.
3. L. Xiongjian,
and Zhang Jing,
“Development
and Regulatory
System Reform of
the
Telecommunicati
ons Industry in
China,” Global
Communications
Newsletter,
November 2003.

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India
sector to a greater competitive
environment in both urban and rural
areas providing equal opportunities
and level playing field for all
players".**
Government has generally followed
an approach of free and unlimited
entry. ***

capacity shortage in big cities. So, then,
the MPT 35 began to actively introduce
foreign funding, modern technologies,
and management methods.
▼
Telecommunications were recognized as
a strategic pivot for the national economy
and developed preferentially under
favorable policies approved by the State
Council. In addition, local governments
also supported telecoms development
These forces accelerated the
development of telecoms and signaled
the beginning of high-speed takeoff of
telecoms in China.
▼
Telecoms network of China became the
second largest in the world. With network
development, its management stepped
into a new period.
▼
China’s telecoms industry needs further
development. The general goal for 2005
is to satisfy the needs of economic and
societal development.

35 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
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Attribute

India
Aspect

References

China
Aspect

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References

China CNC,
China Mobile,
China Unicom,
China CRC, and
China Satellite as
the six main
operators.
Outcome

6.

Two important characteristics of the
growth of cellular market –
1.
Relatively higher growth of prepaid subscribers in comparison
to post-paid Subscribers
2.
Considerable increase in the
level of competition in a
number of service areas.
This trend has become more
pronounced in all service areas after
the entry of the incumbent as the
third operator and a private operator
as the fourth.
There is also competition from the
Wireless in Local Loop with Limited
Mobility.
In light of this development, TRAI
has decided to 'forbear' from
regulating tariffs in the cellular sector
and has left the tariffs to be
determined by market forces.

The TRAI
completed a review
of cellular tariffs
and provided its
assessment of the
current and
expected levels of
competition in
these sectors:
"A stage has been
reached, when
market forces can
effectively regulate
cellular tariff and
the Regulator has
to step aside
except for a broad
supervision in the
interest of the
consumer.”

Retreat from
Social Goals of
Planning:
Domestic
Constraints and
Foreign Pressures

According to
government replies
in Parliament in
1999-2000,
“An important
bottleneck to
foreign direct
investment in the
telecoms sector is
the 49 per cent cap
on foreign
holdings.” 36
The government
reconsidered its
policy of limiting
foreign investment
at 49 per cent. A
high powered

1998
The Ministry of
Information
Industry, a
relatively
independent
regulator,
replaced the
Ministry of Posts
and
Telecommunicati
on (MPT) to
monitor and
regulate China’s
information
technology,
telecommunicatio
ns, and software

Vexed by the ownership cap, several
telecom companies including US
West, Nynex, Swiss Telecom, Bell
Canada, Bezeq of Israel, Telecom
Italia, Shinawatra of Thailand,
Philippine Telecom and Australia’s
Telstra Corporation wound up their
investments in India.
The government decided to allow
restructuring of equity of the licensee
company.
The existing Indian partner was
allowed to acquire the foreign
partner's shareholding.
Merger of Indian companies was
also permitted as long as
competition was not compromised.

Despite opening up the telecoms
industry to foreign investment,
China’s telecoms sector today
remains the most restricted and
regulated of all the major developingcountry countries in the region. The
obstacles faced by foreign players
include lack of clear and concise
legislation governing the sector,
regulatory implementation and
enforcement, true competition, and
regulatory independence. Thus far,
government has only allowed limited
competition through the creation of a
number of operators, mostly
diversified components of its
operational arm, China Telecom
(CT), and all still state owned. While
the regulatory environment governing
the sector has been restructured to
separate the regulatory and
operational entities, the impartiality of
the regulatory environment has been
questioned.
Industry experts argue that more efforts
are needed to establish a truly
competitive environment in China,
including the introduction of mechanism
of competition by Chinese enterprises
with foreign counterparts in China.

36 Declining FDI flow in telecom sector; The Hindu; August 9, 2000; http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/2000/08/09/stories/06090006.htm
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Attribute

India
Aspect

Outcome

References

China
Aspect

committee under
the chairmanship of
the finance minister
looked into the
scope for lifting the
49 per cent
investment cap.
The move followed
requests by leading
domestic telecom
companies, who
seemed unable to
raise the capital
necessary for
expanding
services. 37

industries. Thus
begun the reform
of telecoms
industry.

Spate of mergers
and acquisitions in
the Indian cellular
industry.

The monopoly in
telecoms services
was broken and
competition into
the market
introduced.

Directions/Trends/Descriptions
China
India

References

The move to open up international
long distance sector well ahead of
the WTO commitment of year 2004
was also viewed as a sop for
international firms investing in Indian
telecom.

Privatization is still lacking. So is a legal
system.
Whether the market structure would bring
fair and just competition remains to be
seen.
In the absence of a telecommunications
law, the regulatory organizations cannot
regulate operators in a competitive
environment.
Foreign telecommunications operators
entering the Chinese market remain
skeptical about the regulatory system in
China.

37 Panel set up to mull Lifting 49% FDI cap on telecom; Business Standard; November 10,2000
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Appendix B. Variables: Their Working Definitions and Literature References
Variables
Telecoms reform variables (Rit)
1.

Full_priv

Working Definitions
Vector of telecoms reforms

Literature Reference
Bortolott et al. 2004.

1.

Carsten et al. 2002.

Full (or control) privatization
for a nation in a year in
which the majority owners
are non-state

2.

Partial_priv

2.

Partial (or revenue)
privatization is for a nation
in a year when there is
positive private ownership
but state ownership still
dominates

3.

Priv

3.

Privatization represents a
variable for a nation in a
year when there is either full
or partial privatization

4.

Competition

4.

An index measuring the
degree of competition in the
telecoms sector

Country economic indicators
[Control Variables (Xit)]:
1.

Population

Control variables defined as:

1.

The population of a nation,
in millions

2.

UrbanPop

2.

The share of urban
population of a nation

3.

GDP-PC

3.

GDP per capita of a nation,
in 1995 U.S. $
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Kilkeri, Sunita; Nellis, John; and
Shirley, Mary. Privatization: The
Lessons of Experience. Washington,
D.C. World Bank, 1992.

Literature cites these macroeconomic
indicators to come up with a summary
description of economic environment
in a sample country.
Li, Wei and Xu, Lixin Colin. 2004.
The Impact of Privatization and
Competition in the
Telecommunications Sector Around
The World. Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. XLVII.
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4.

Variables
log(CPI)

Country Specific Effects (φ)

Time Trend (t)

Working Definitions
Logarithm of Consumer
Price index (CPI = 1 in
1990)
This represents country-specific
heterogeneity (e.g., interest group
pressures), which might influence
both policy changes and industry
performance.
This will capture the effects of
technological changes.

Telecom performance variables
[Outcome Measures (yit)]
1.

Inv_PC

1.Telecoms investment per capita

2.

PLocal

2. The local price index

3.

Qindex

3.The output index

4.

LPindex

4.The index of labor productivity

5.

Lindex

5.The labor index.

6.

Mobile_Density

6.Mobile telephone density
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Literature Reference

4.

Roller, Lars-Hendrick, and
Waverman, Leonard.
“Telecommunications
Infrastructure and Economic
Development: A Simultaneous
Approach. The American Economic
Review 91 (2001): 909-23.
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Appendix C. The Elements of Grounded Theory
Grounded theory has three basic elements: concepts, categories and propositions. The
basic units of analysis are concepts, for it is through conceptualization of data, not the actual data
per se, that theory will emerge. According to Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7).
“Theories can't be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; that is,
from "raw data." The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or analyzed as, potential
indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels. … Only by comparing
incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic
units for theory.”
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 7) defines categories, the second element of grounded
theory, in the following way:
“Categories are higher in level and more abstract than the concepts they represent. They
are generated through the same analytic process of making comparisons to highlight similarities
and differences that is used to produce lower level concepts. Categories are the "cornerstones" of
developing theory. They provide the means by which the theory can be integrated.”
The third element of grounded theory, propositions, indicates generalized relationships
between a category and its concepts and between discrete categories. Glaser and Strauss (1967)
originally termed this 'hypotheses'. However, Whetten (1989, p. 492) points out that propositions
involve conceptual relationships whereas hypotheses require measured relationships. The
grounded approach produces conceptual and not measured relationships, thus the former term is
more accepted.
It is through an iterative process that the concepts, categories, and propositions are
generated and developed. Grounded theory is not generated a priori, rather, it is,
... inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, discovered,
developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data
pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory should stand in
reciprocal relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather,
one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. (Strauss
and Corbin, 1990, p. 23. Emphasis added.)

The Process of Generating Grounded Theory
Bearing in mind that a fine balance between prescription and generality is required, based
on Glaser & Strauss’ lean structure, Table C-1 provides a summary interpretation of the phases,
procedures or steps, and research quality criteria to the generation of grounded theory 38 . This
summary forms the template for subsequent description of how these prescriptions are applied in
this dissertation research paper.

38 The original derivation of grounded theory (Glaser, & Strauss, 1967). focused critically on the generation of theory
from data without reference to the researcher’s prior knowledge of the phenomena under investigation. This derivation
was not clear and precise enough to define the methodological procedures or steps required of the researcher in
correctly undertaking the process (Schatzman, 1991, p 303-314) The procedural stages Glaser & Strauss (1967)
outlined were reflective of a rather "parsimonious structure" (Miller & Fredericks 1999, p.538). However, recent
attempts to overcome this lack of procedural clarity (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990) have received criticism because the
operational procedures prescribed by the authors implicitly require application of the researcher’s prior knowledge
(Robrecht, 1995) and that is a violation of the underlying premise of the methodology.
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PHASE
ACTIVITY
RATIONALE
RESEARCH DESIGN PHASE
Step 1 Review of technical
Definition of research Focuses
literature
question
efforts
Definition of a priori Constrains irrelevant variation and sharpens external
constructs
validity
Step 2 Selecting cases
Theoretical, not
Focuses efforts on theoretically useful cases (e.g., those that test
random, sampling
and/or extend theory)
DATA COLLECTION PHASE
Step 3 Develop rigorous data Create case study
Increases reliability Increases construct validity
collection protocol
database
Strengthens grounding of theory by triangulation of
Employ multiple
evidence. Enhances internal validity
Synergistic view of evidence
data collection
methods
Qualitative and
quantitative data
Step 4 Entering the field
Overlap data
Speeds analysis and reveals
collection
helpful adjustments to data collection
and analysis
Allows investigators to take advantage of emergent
Flexible and
themes and unique case features
opportunistic data
collection methods
DATA ORDERING PHASE
Step 5 Data ordering
Arraying events
Facilitates easier data analysis. Allows examination of
chronologically
processes
DATA ANALYSIS PHASE
Step 6 Analyzing
Use open
Develop concepts, categories and properties
data relating to
coding
Develop connections between a category and its subthe first case
Use axial
categories
Integrate categories to build theoretical framework
coding
Use selective
All forms of coding enhance internal validity
coding
Step 7 Theoretical sampling Literal and theoretical
Confirms, extends, and sharpens theoretical framework
replication across cases
(go to step 2 until
theoretical saturation)
Step 8 Reaching closure
Theoretical saturation
Ends process when marginal improvement becomes small
when possible
LITERATURE COMPARISON PHASE
Step 9 Compare emergent
Comparisons with
Improves construct definitions, and therefore internal
theory with extant
conflicting frameworks
validity
literature
Comparisons with
Also improves external validity by establishing the
similar frameworks
domain to which the study's findings can be generalised
Source: This table represents author’s modifications to one referenced in Pandit, N. R. (1996).

Table C-1: The process of building grounded theory
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Research Design Phase. Easterby-Smith et al. (1990, p. 21) defines research design in
terms of:
... what kind of evidence is gathered from where, and how such evidence is interpreted in
order to provide good answers to the basic research question[s].
The first step is to define the basic research questions narrowly so that the research is
focused, yet broad enough to allow for flexibility and serendipity.
'Technical literature' (i.e., reports of research studies and theoretical and philosophical
papers characteristic of professional and disciplinary writing) on the general problem area is a
good source of research questions in grounded theory studies (Strass and Corbin 1990, p. 52).
Once basic research questions are generated and the research is focused, the next aspect
of research design and the second step is to select the first case. The principle of theoretical
sampling refers to the case selection as the process of data collection for generating theory
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect
next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges (Glaser and Strauss
1967, p. 45).
During initial data collection, a full 'deep' coverage of the data is necessary because the
main categories are emerging. Subsequently, the focus changes to the development of properties
and propositions and at that stage, theoretical sampling deals only with collecting data on
categories. The category's 'theoretical saturation' determines the stopping point where the
theoretical sampling should stop. Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe the theoretical saturation as
when:
... no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can develop properties of the
category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically
confident that a category is saturated ... when one category is saturated, nothing remains but to go
on to new groups for data on other categories, and attempt to saturate these categories also
39
(p.65).

In practical terms, theoretical sampling has two stages: an initial case is selected; the data
analysis pertaining to this case should point to an emerging theory, and based on that, additional
cases are chosen.
The initial case (unit of data) in this study is the literature on the subject of telecoms
restructuring. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990),
The literature can be used as secondary sources of data. Research publications often include
quoted materials from interviews and field notes and these quotations can be used as secondary
sources of data for your own purposes. The publications may also include descriptive materials
concerning events, actions, settings, and actors' perspectives, that can be used as data using the
methods described (p. 52).

The grounded analysis of the first 'literature' case from India led to the generation of the
initial theoretical framework of complexity analysis. Additional 'empirical' cases from China,

39 Not all categories are equally relevant, and so the depth of enquiry into each one should not be the same. When the
core categories, i.e., those with the greatest explanatory power, become stable in the face of new data and rich in detail,
they are considered saturated.
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Russia, Viet Nam, Cots Rica, Uzbekistan, one at a time, have been used to test and extend this
framework. 40
After the analysis of the six cases, there was hardly any improvement needed to the
theoretical framework and the decision to conclude the research was taken. This experience is
line with Martin and Turner (1986) who affirm:
By the time three or four sets of data have been analyzed, the majority of useful concepts will have
been discovered (p.149).

Data Collection Phase. About the data collection phase, the grounded approach
advocates the use of multiple data sources converging on the same phenomenon and terms these
'slices of data.' Glaser and Strauss (1967) remind the reader,
In theoretical sampling, no one kind of data on a category nor technique for data collection is
necessarily appropriate. Different kinds of data give the analyst different views or vantage points
from which to understand a category and to develop its properties; these different views we have
called slices of data. While the [researcher] may use one technique of data collection primarily,
theoretical sampling for saturation of a category allows a multifaceted investigation, in which
there are no limits to the techniques of data collection, the way they are used, or the types of data
acquired. (p.65, Emphasis in original.)

In the same vein, other authors advocate a synergistic approach:
... case study research can involve qualitative data only, quantitative only, or both... Moreover, the
combination of data types can be highly synergistic (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.538).

According to the synergistic approach (or 'data triangulation'), qualitative data can
indicate directly observable relationships and corroborate the findings from quantitative data.
Qualitative data can help understand the rationale of the theory and underlying relationships.
The purpose of using multiple data sources is to enhance construct validity and reliability. To
further enhance reliability, there is a need for a case study database which is a formal assembly
of evidence distinct from the case study report. As Yin (1989) states:
Every case study project should strive to develop a formal, retrievable database, so that in
principle, other investigators can review the evidence directly and not be limited to the written
reports. In this manner, the database will increase markedly the reliability of an entire case study.
(p.98-99, Emphasis added.)

40 The principle of theoretical sampling points out that each additional case serves specific purposes within the overall
scope of enquiry. Yin identified three options (1989, p. 53-54):
(a) Choose a case to fill theoretical categories, to extend the emerging theory; and/or,
(b) Choose a case to replicate previous case(s) to test the emerging theory; or,
(c) Choose a case that is a polar opposite to extend the emerging theory.
Each additional case must, therefore, be carefully selected to produce similar results (a literal replication - options (a)
and (b) above); or, contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication - option (c) above).
The second case or unit of data, China which experienced a telecoms restructuring during the period 1990-99, was
selected for the purpose of literal replication, that is, to fill theoretical categories and to test the emerging theory. The
third case, Russia which experienced contrary results during the period 1975-89 was again chosen for the purposes of
theoretical replication.
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The third step, therefore, involves the development of a rigorous data collection protocol by:
a. Using multiple data collection methods that account for both qualitative and
quantitative data and systematically
b. Establishing a case study database.
The principal data source in this study for the six 'empirical' cases (i.e., India, China,
Russia, Viet Nam, Costa Rica, and Uzbekistan) was reports in newspapers, trade journals,
business journals, government publications, annual company documents and commercial
diplomacy press releases. The World Bank Institute and the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) websites are the largest on-line sources of telecoms business information of its
kind. The International Trade and Commercial Diplomacy family of complimentary databases
contains more than 100 article abstracts, forecasts, statistical series and full text records on a
broad range of business and industry restructuring issues. While reading an article published in
the Commercial Diplomacy website, the author thought of developing grounded theory based on
this type of data.
In this dissertation research project, Commercial Diplomacy documentary sources have
been treated like sets of field notes. Analysis and category generation was commenced at the first
paragraph of each report obtained from the Commercial Diplomacy Institute 41 , and a theoretical
framework generated which would handle the aspects perceived to be of interest to each
paragraph.
The preceding step ensures that the fourth step involving data collection and analyses is
done simultaneously, while maintaining flexibility. Often adjustments are made to the data
collection process in light of the emerging findings. This flexibility is in line with what
Eisenhardt described as 'controlled opportunism (1989, p.12).

41 A former U.S. Trade Representative, Geza Fukutituke, whom the author interviewed during the course of the
qualitative research phase, permitted a full access to several documents and research reports prepared under his
guidance at the Monterey Institute of International Trade and Commercial Diplomacy.
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The dissertation approach as a whole must consider data collection, data ordering, and
data analysis as interrelated steps depicted in figure C-1 in which the attached numbers indicate
the activity's analytic sequence identified earlier in Table C-1.
1.1.1.1.1 Data Analysis
(4)
1.1.1.1.2 Theory
Development (5)
1.1.1.1.3 Data Ordering
(3)
1.1.1.1.4 Theory Saturation ?

1.1.1.1.5 Yes

1.1.1.1.6 Data Collection
(2)
1.1.1.1.7 No
1.1.1.1.9 Theoretical
Sampling (1)

1.1.1.1.8 Reach
Closure
(6)

Figure C-1: The Interrelated Processes of Data Collection, Data Ordering, and Data Analysis to
Build Grounded Theory
The process of coding involves the use of this general framework to generate concepts by
performing data analysis for each case. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), coding 42
42 Open coding, axial coding, and selective coding represent the three analytic types and the researcher must not
necessarily move from open through axial to selective coding in a strict linear progression.
Open coding deals with the labeling and categorizing of phenomena as indicated by the data. Labeling and categorizing
produce concepts which constitute the basic building blocks in grounded theory construction.
Open coding applies the concept of 'the comparative method', which amounts to asking questions and making
comparisons. Initially, simple questions such as what, where, how, when, how much, etc. break down data. Then, we
compare data and group together similar incidents and give the same conceptual label. Categorizing refers to the
process of grouping concepts at a higher and more abstract level.
While open coding divides and sub-divides data into concepts and categories, axial coding makes connections between
a category and its sub-categories (i.e., not between discrete categories which is done in selective coding) and puts those
data back together in new ways, thereby identifying and developing main categories and their sub-categories.
Selective coding refers to the integration of the categories that have been developed to form the initial theoretical
framework.
First, there is a story which is simply a descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of study and then there is
the story line which refers to the conceptualization of this story (abstracting). Upon analysis, the story line is
transformed into the core category.
The core category (i.e., the central idea, event or happening) is the phenomenon. Other categories relate to this core
category in accordance with the schema. Causal conditions refer to the events which lead to the development of the
phenomenon. Context defines the particular set of conditions and intervening conditions, the broader set of conditions,
in which the phenomenon is embedded. Action/interaction strategies imply the actions and responses that occur as the
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... represents the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualized, and put back together
in new ways. It is the central process by which theories are built from data (p. 57).

The purpose of coding is to suggest relationships and let the data validate by moving between
different planes (namely, asking questions, generating propositions and making comparisons) of
a paradigm model depicted in figure C- 2 below.
Causal Conditions

Phenomenon

Context

Intervening Conditions

Action / Interaction Strategies

Consequences
Figure C-2: The Paradigm Model
Corbin and Strauss (1990) stress that an important activity during coding is the writing of
memos. 43
Writing theoretical memos is an integral part of doing grounded theory. Since the analyst cannot
readily keep track of all the categories, properties, hypotheses, and generative questions that
evolve from the analytical process, there must be a system for doing so. The use of memos
result of the phenomenon, and the outcomes, both intended and unintended, of these actions and responses render
explicit the consequences.
Strauss and Corbin summarize it best: “The core category must be the sun, standing in orderly systematic relationships
to its planets (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 124).
The underlying purpose of the paradigm model is to allow the researcher to relate data in complex ways while thinking
about them systematically. According to this model, subsidiary categories are related to the core category.
43 Memos may be distinguished by their types and usages: code memos, theoretical memos and operational memos.
Code memos refer to open coding and focus on conceptual labeling. Theoretical memos are about axial and selective
coding and thus point to paradigm features and indications of process. Operational memos contain directions
concerning the evolving research design.
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constitutes such a system. Memos are not simply "ideas." They are involved in the formulation
and revision of theory during the research process (p.10).

In this phase of the dissertation research, data were analyzed using the author’s own
intuition, judgment, conceptual decision, and interpretations. The use of computer programs to
aid the analysis of qualitative data is a recent innovation. However, no qualitative data analysis
software package has been used in this research effort to facilitate the construction of case study
databases.
The seventh step in theory building case research entails testing and developing the
framework with additional cases, invoking the principle of theoretical sampling. The purpose, as
referenced earlier, is to extend and/or sharpen the emerging theory by filling in categories, which
warrant further refinement and/or development. Reaching closure, the eighth step, is also taken
according to the principle of theoretical saturation, that is, when the marginal value of the new
data becomes rather insignificant.
Literature Comparison Phase. About the ninth and final step, Eisenhardt(1989)
reminds the reader:
… tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, … and theoretical
level of the theory building from case study research ... because the findings often rest on a very
limited number of cases (p. 545).

The emergent theory of telecoms restructuring has been compared with the extant
theories in the broader field of crisis hypothesis, special interest groups, learning, foreign aid,
and political institutions. This revealed the discovered theory to resemble in many ways Qiang’s
and Xu’s (2004)"constituents demand hypothesis, private-interest hypothesis, the ideology
hypothesis, and some hypothesis emerging from the new institutional economics."
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Appendix D. Glossary
Access Deficit Charge (ADC)
Access Deficit Charge (ADC), is the amount payable by the service provider at the
caller's end to the service provider at the receiving end for accessing services rendered by
the latter in domestic long distance telephony.
Calling Party Pays
Calling Party Pays (CPP) refers to one of the methods of billing calls whereby the called
mobile party pays for the airtime. This asymmetry exists only in some countries but not
in others.
Competition
Experts argue that competition, when applied to telecommunications, leads to more and
better services at more affordable rates, and that experience supports this view.
Interconnect Usage Charge (IUC)
Interconnection Usage Charge covers charges payable by one operator to another for
origination, transit, and termination of calls in a multi-operator environment.
Liberalization
Liberalization refers to a process of changing state, social, and economic institutions to
allow and promote increased use of market mechanisms to guide social, economic, and
political life.
Privatization
A very broad term--but most simply, privatization is the transfer of assets or service
delivery from the government to the private sector. Privatization runs a very broad range,
sometimes leaving very little government involvement, and other times creating
partnerships between government and private service providers where government is still
the dominant player.
Purchasing Power Parity
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a theory of exchange rate determination and a way to
compare the average costs of goods and services between countries. The theory is based
on an extension and variation of the "law of one price" as applied to the aggregate
economy.
Teledensity
Teledensity refers to the number of telephones per 100 people in a region.

Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA)
The TRA promotes and balances the interests of subscribers and other users, and
promotes effective and fair competition among new and existing licensed operators. The
TRA is required to carry out its duties and exercise its powers in a non-discriminatory
and transparent manner.
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Unified Licensing Regime
In view of recent technological developments in the telecom sector, extended scope of
service provided by new technologies, falling cost of wireless services, blurring of
differences between wireline and wireless, increasing competition among the services,
the converging tariffs for wire and wireless services and the international trend for nonservice specific licenses through a process of Authorization/Converged licenses, today
there is no justification in continuing a service-wise licensing regime. Instead, the most
favored choice is for a unified licensing regime whereby service providers are given the
opportunity to offer any or all telecom services using technology of their choice. This
regime promises economies of scope/scale and flexibility in regime will result in
new/existing services being offered to consumers at affordable prices.
Unified Access Service
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) gave its recommendations to the
Government of India in October 2003 to move toward a unified licensing regime, starting
with a unified access-licensing regime for basic and cellular services in the first phase,
thereby ensuring technology neutrality for service providers. Unified access relates to all:
wired or wireless, fixed or mobile.
USO Fund
The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USO), set up by the Government of India,
supports the spread of mobile Internet to the interior of India. A separate administrative
organization attached to the Department of Telecom administers the fund whose
disbursement is accomplished through a multi-layered bidding process.
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